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He Gave Up On Army Career

STATINTL

Marasco Is No Abrams Booster

(Former Green Beret Capt. Robert F. Marasco and seven other Special Forces members were involved in one of the major controversies of the Vietnam War in 1969 when accused of murdering a triple agent. Now a civilian in Bloomfield, he spent many hours being interviewed by Daily Journal reporter Thomas Michalski, recalling events surrounding the assassination that he says never were made public).

By THOMAS MICHALSKI
Journal Staff Writer

The decision to drop murder charges against eight Green Berets accused of "eliminating" Vietnamese triple-agent Thai Khac Chuyen in June 1969 was "approved" by President Nixon after the Central Intelligence Agency refused to provide witnesses for the court-martial.

The official word came from Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor in September who said, "in the interest of national security it is my judgment that under the circumstances, the defendants cannot receive a fair trial."

Resor, after noting that the Berets would be assigned to duties "outside of Vietnam," went on record as disapproving "the act which the Green Berets were accused of carrying out."

"I want to make it clear," he said, "that the acts which were charged, but not proven, represent a fundamental violation of Army regulations, orders and principles. The Army will not and cannot condone the unlawful acts of the kind alleged."

Meanwhile, White House Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler first contended that President Nixon "had nothing

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to do with the dismissal of the charges. He later acknowledged, however, that the President was "somewhat involved," although Ziegler insisted that the Army acted on its own.

The press secretary said CIA Chief Richard Helms decided that the agency's employees would not be allowed to testify for reasons of national security.

"The President," Ziegler said, "approved the decision."

"We were released on Sept. 30, 1969," former Capt. Robert F. Marasco said. "And we received VIP treatment all the way home."

"They were all crying," Marasco recalled. "My wife, my first wife, wasn't there. She was afraid of the news media. She was afraid they would ask her what she thought and that she would have to tell the truth."

Marasco's first wife — he has since remarried — was deeply involved in the anti-war movement, he said.

"She would not lie to the press," Marasco said. "She would have told them what she thought of the war, the military . . ."

The couple later discussed their problems and it was agreed that they would file for a Mexican divorce.

Friends and neighbors, however, treated the Green Beret with all the honors due to a homecoming hero.

Marasco said the Chuyen matter "was very hard on my parents. They were happy when it was all over."

Throughout it all, Marasco said he still considered himself

a good commander and was even thinking of making the Army a career — until he received orders to report to Ft. Riley, Kansas.

"When I saw those orders I was furious," he said. "I guess I was more sore than anything because the Army was putting me in a shelf job. They were hiding me."

Marasco went to Washington, to his original assignment branch, and put in his papers to leave active duty.

"They told me I had to wait seven months," he recalled.

Meanwhile, Marasco received word that Rep. L. Mendel Rivers, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, wanted to meet with him.

"He asked me if there was anything he could do," Marasco said. "I told him I wanted out of the Army."

Rivers, Marasco said, called Gen. William Westmoreland, who was then Army chief of staff, and on Oct. 14, 1969 he was honorably discharged.

But Marasco's problems were not over.

Several weeks later he flew to Mexico City and filed for divorce. Three days later, after 17 months in Vietnam, going through the hell of a possible court martial, through a divorce and just getting out of the Army and picking up where he left off — Marasco was nearly killed in a car accident.

Marasco was driving north on Route 35 in South Amboy when a second car operated by a 22-year-old Cliffwood man crossed the median barrier

and crashed head-on into Marasco's car.

The driver of the second car was killed. Marasco suffered extensive injuries and was in a coma for three days at Perth Amboy General Hospital. A passenger in his car also suffered extensive injuries.

There were unofficial reports that the accident "could have been arranged." Marasco discounts those reports.

"I guess there were always possibilities," he said. "There were anti-war people, and I'm not talking about student groups. There are some very big international organizations who oppose the war for political reasons."

Marasco said he has no evidence that the accident was planned.

"I had a private investigator look into it," he said. "He found nothing unusual. The mishap was sheer coincidence."

An insurance settlement of \$10,000 just about paid for hospital and other medical bills. Marasco was out of work for more than a year.

"I sold a little insurance," he said. "I am now vice president of my father's agency in Bloomfield, but I don't know what the future holds for me."

Insurance is what he knows best, "outside of espionage, and there is not a very good market in that field for me because my picture has been on the front pages all over the world."

Marasco says today he has no ill feelings about the Army.

"I talked with a great many military men and they all feel that I got a raw deal," he said. "I do have some very strong feelings about Gen. (Creighton) Abrams (now Army chief of staff) and a few others."

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Marasco: CIA Eyed Air Drop To Free Berets

STATINTL

(Former Green Beret Capt. Robert F. Marasco and seven other Special Forces members were involved in one of the major controversies of the Vietnam War in 1969 when accused of murdering a triple agent. Now a civilian in Bloomfield, he spent many hours being interviewed by Daily Journal reporter Thomas Michalski, recalling events surrounding the assassination that he says never were made public).

By THOMAS MICHALSKI
Journal Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. Special Forces in an "unsanctioned move" were to free eight Green Berets from military custody in September 1969 by means of an incredible escape plan that involved a parachute drop of 1,300 men on Long Binh and a flight to Burma, according to former Capt. Robert F. Marasco.

Marasco, one of the eight charged with the murder of Vietnamese triple-agent Thai Khac Chuyen, said "the highly secret, unorthodox and unconventional" escape plan has never before been made public.

In telling the story to The Daily Journal, Marasco said the parachutists would have distracted base personnel enough to allow the landing of a twin-engine C-7A Caribou on a roadway at Long Binh, pick up the Berets and fly off to Burma.

Once in Burma, Marasco said, the Berets, with CIA funds, would have established guerrilla forces for counter-intelligence work in Red China and other parts of Asia.

"We were in the stockade three weeks," Marasco said. "We were in maximum security where they held rapists and

"Officers are never put in jail. They are usually held in house arrest."

Such was the case of Col. Robert B. Rheault, Green Beret commander, who also was involved in the Chuyen incident.

Marasco's cell was four by seven. It had no toilet facilities. A 200-watt bulb burned continuously, and the average temperature, he said, was 120 degrees.

"We lay in these cells in undershorts," Marasco recalled. "When you had to go to the latrine you had to scream. 'Guard, prisoner in

Cell Two has to go to the bathroom . . ."

Marasco said, "We were, in fact, prisoners of war. POWs of the American military."

"The jail's commander, a lieutenant colonel, made our lives as bearable as possible with books, cigarettes, things like that."

While in the Long Binh stockade, the Berets were "still convinced that eventually somebody would find out what was going on and that we would be let out."

In early August an American newspaperman was in an enlisted man's club when he heard two military policemen talking about the case.

"He went to MACV — Military Assistance Command, Vietnam — and started asking questions," Marasco said.

On Aug. 15 the Army, after having held the Berets for over three weeks without officially charging them with any crime, issued a news release that said "eight Green Berets are being held for murder and conspiracy to commit murder."

Murder carries a minimum of life sentence and conspiracy a maximum of life imprisonment.

"Now that it was all out in

the open we said to the CIA 'You'd better get the word back to Washington that if you continue this foolishness you have to assume the potential of us compromising every high

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level intelligence operation in Southeast Asia," Marasco said.

"We didn't do anything that wasn't done regularly," Marasco said. "The only difference is that it was usually given to the Vietnamese to do for us."

"But, because Project Gamma was a unilateral operation, we couldn't do that," Marasco said. "The Vietnamese weren't supposed to know Project Gamma existed."

Military attorneys for the Berets were joined by a host of well-known stateside lawyers. One of the civilian attorneys said, "I have evidence to prove that the CIA has ordered the killing and effluated the killing of over 100 people in South Vietnam during the past year."

George W. Gregory, attorney for Major Thomas C.

Middleton Jr., cabled Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird to charge that the Berets were being held under "inhuman conditions."

Shortly afterward, the men were released from Long Binh jail and allowed to stay in regular billets.

The handling of the case also stirred reaction among some congressmen. Sen. Ernest F. Hollings of South Carolina said, "These men are soldiers who were doing a job that had to be done."

Rep. L. Mendel Rivers, chairman of the House Armed

case is going from bad to worse."

Attorneys for some of the men, meanwhile, contended that their clients could not get a fair trial in Vietnam because Gen. Creighton Abrams, commander of U.S. Forces in Vietnam, and Maj. Gen. G. L. Mabry, commander of support troops in Vietnam, were "prejudiced because they have prejudged the defendants."

"Abrams caused this whole thing simply because of service rivalry between the regular Army and elite Green Berets," one attorney told the Associated Press.

Meanwhile, the threat by the Berets to expose other CIA secret operations got back to CIA Chief Richard Helms, "who sat down with President Nixon," Marasco said.

Marasco said a few days later Abrams met with President Nixon at the Western White House to discuss troop withdrawals.

"The next day Nixon's military aide called us and said, 'Forget it, you're not coming home,'" Marasco said. "Abrams, the aide said, told President Nixon that if he wanted the troop withdrawals to go smoothly, without problems, he wanted the Green Berets."

Abrams, Marasco said, pointed out to the President that as military commander in Vietnam he should be allowed to handle the case.

The exchange, Marasco said, occurred in September, 1969, when troop withdrawals were in their early stages. President Nixon, he said, agreed to allow Abrams to handle the Green Beret case.

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Feared He Was Next

STATINTL

Sergeant Revealed Killing

(Former Green Beret Capt. Robert F. Marasco and seven other Special Forces members were involved in one of the major controversies of the Vietnam War in 1969 when accused of murdering a triple agent. Now a civilian in Bloomfield, he spent many hours being interviewed by Daily Journal reporter Thomas Michalski, recalling events surrounding the assassination that he says never were made public).

By THOMAS MICHALSKI
Journal Staff Writer

The murder of a South Vietnamese triple-agent in June 1969 came to light when one of the eight Green Berets involved "blew the whistle" because he thought "he was next on the list."

Former Capt. Robert F. Marasco said a sergeant, Alvin L. Smith Jr., started a chain of events that caused the commander of the U.S. Forces in Vietnam "to lose his cool."

Marasco earlier disclosed the order to murder Thai Khac Chuyen came directly from a high Central Intelligence Agency official.

Chuyen was "eliminated" — thrown into the South China Sea — after being shot twice in the head, on or about June 15, 1969.

"I had about two more weeks to serve in Vietnam," Marasco recalled. "Smith, who was in on the negotiations and decisions all the time, was very friendly with Chuyen."

"They were buddies, which was his first mistake. You never become a buddy with your principal agent. It's just bad intelligence practice."

Marasco said Smith also was friendly with Chuyen's wife, Pham Kim Lien, and her sister.

"He was always going to Saigon with Chuyen for one thing or another," Marasco said. "But it didn't seem wrong until afterwards."

All through the negotiations concerning Chuyen's fate, Marasco said, Smith "was not agreeing that he (Chuyen) should be eliminated. He was not disagreeing, either. He had no alternative, but he had a special feeling for Chuyen."

Marasco said Smith "became very nervous for a number of reasons. He had recently buried his mother in Florida and had become quite neurotic in Vietnam."

"He had decided that because he was the only enlisted man, a non-commissioned officer, involved in the Chuyen thing, that we did not trust him and that we would kill him."

"That was absolutely ridiculous," Marasco said. "The thought never entered our minds."

In August 1969, Marasco said, Smith went to the CIA station chief at Nha Trang.

"But he went to a different agent, not the one who was involved in the thing from the outset," Marasco said. "This agent did not know anything about the Chuyen thing."

Marasco pointed out that "everything is celled and compartmentalized in the intelligence community. Sometimes the right hand doesn't know what the left is doing."

The Nha Trang CIA man directed Smith to Marasco. Smith, based on his belief that the Berets "wanted" to assassinate him, refused and, instead, was sent to Army officials in Saigon, Marasco said.

"He told his story to the

must understand that the Army had no real knowledge of Project Gamma. Although we were military, we, in fact, worked for SOG — Special Operations Group."

The Ghuyen incident, however, went up Marasco's chain of command to Col. Robert B. Rheault, Green Beret commander at the time.

"He made the final decision on the assassination, based on our information and that provided by the CIA," Marasco said. "We assumed that Rheault went up his chain of command as we went up ours. He did not."

Smith, Marasco said, told his story to an unidentified Army officer in Saigon who relayed it, through channels, to Gen. Creighton Abrams, commander of the U.S. forces at the time and now Army chief of staff.

"Abrams called in an aide, a brigadier general, who was supposed to know all about intelligence operations in Vietnam," Marasco said. "He was asked about the Chuyen matter."

"The aide, having been in Vietnam only a month, said 'we don't have any cross-border operations.' He said there were no CIA agents controlling military people and that the Special Forces are only involved in advisory training."

Abrams, Marasco said, then called Rheault to Saigon "to square things away."

"We had come up with a

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cover story, before, about what had happened to Chuyen," Marasco said. "Just in case it was needed, it was

standard procedure."

The story was that "we had found out that Chuyen might have been a bad guy, but that we didn't know for sure and that he was sent to Cambodia on a mission. We had a helicopter log and it showed that a guy went from Nha Trang at the specified time to the Cambodian border where he was dropped off."

"Chuyen was chubby and we happened to have a heavy-set Oriental in Project Gamma who looked like him."

"In the cover report," Marasco explained, "we said Chuyen went to Cambodia, had one-way radio transmission, and that he was supposed to contact us and never did."

Marasco, who could not identify Chuyen's double, said "he wasn't really that involved in the operation."

"We said in the cover story that Chuyen was a bad guy and that he just never came back from Cambodia," Marasco said.

One of the military's unwritten rules, Marasco said, is "to always cover your commander, no matter what."

"This is why Rheault gave the general the cover story but, according to a CIA 'after action' report, Abrams 'became very upset because one of his senior commanders apparently had lied to him,'" Marasco said.

Abrams, Marasco said, was further angered by the fact that civilians, in this case the CIA, were in charge of the Berets.

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Laos: New facts on secret war

By Richard E. Ward
Second of a series

Clandestine sabotage, combat and espionage missions have been conducted in Laos and Cambodia by U.S. military personnel, despite White House denials and contrary to congressional prohibition.

Such missions are top-secret actions directed by the Studies and Observations Group of the U.S. Army Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, located in Saigon and generally known by its initials, MAC-V SOG. The most comprehensive picture of these activities available, based on testimony of former participants in these missions, known as Command and Control operations, is contained in a series of three articles by Gerald Meyer, published in the Nov. 5, 10 and 12 issues of the St. Louis Post Dispatch.

Unless otherwise indicated all material in this article is based on the articles by Meyer, a regular staff member of the Post Dispatch, who interviewed former Special Forces members, helicopter pilots and others who took part in the Command and Control operations during the 1960s and into 1972.

The Post Dispatch's informants, whose names were not revealed to protect them from possible prosecution, stated that the clandestine commando raids were still in progress as of August. One informant said that in August when he left Bien Hoa, one of the Command and Control bases, more than 100 Army Special Forces were stationed there and reinforcements were being sent from Okinawa.

The commando raids in recent years, utilizing Army personnel who generally command teams composed of mercenaries from Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam, were also sent into North Vietnam and liberated areas of South Vietnam. There is evidence that the Air Force has operational jurisdiction over a similar program based at Nakon Phanom, Thailand, just across the Laotian border.

Commando raids were ordered by

Washington against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the early 1960's, as documented in the Pentagon Papers, but which provided few details. The present program, apparently undergoing a partial "Vietnamization," is an outgrowth of the original escalation of CIA-Special Forces missions in Indochina ordered by the Kennedy administration.

Although the Post Dispatch does not mention the CIA, it is clear that Studies and Observations Group is a CIA operation. The informant most knowledgeable about SOG, a Special Forces officer, was described by correspondent Meyer as fearful of being jailed or fined, saying: "If I talked to you and got caught, I could get 10 years in prison and a \$10,000 fine."

The Special Forces officer said that the connections between Command and Control and the 'MAC-V SOG' organization in Saigon were so highly classified that we would not risk commenting on them," wrote Meyer.

Despite his reluctance to talk the officer explained that the Command and Control operations were "formally" under the direction of the Fifth Special Forces Group until January 1971, when the Fifth Special Forces officially was described as having been withdrawn from Vietnam. Actually, according to Meyer, "numerous Fifth Special Forces were left behind at Command and Control bases throughout South Vietnam" and various efforts were employed to conceal their continued presence. They were forbidden to wear the green beret and Special Forces insignia while they remained in Indochina.

Symbolic of the Command and Control operations, was a gestapo-like insignia, used by one of the units, a green-bereted skull with blood dripping from its teeth. This was the emblem of Command and Control Central. There were at least two other main units, Command and Control North and Command and Control South. The North, Central and South referred to the base areas of the commando teams.

Apparently most of the operations under the Command and Control program, at least in recent years, took place in southern Laos. However, after the U.S.-Saigon invasion of Cambodia and subsequent Congressional prohibition against use of U.S. ground troops in Cambodia, it is safe to assume that the secret U.S. missions were increased in the latter country.

Airborne bandits

Typically, Command and Control missions comprised several U.S. officers or NCO's commanding a mercenary team which would land in Laos or Cambodia, and "aimed at taking prisoners, gathering information and disrupting communist activities." The commandos would be transported in four helicopters, while four helicopter gunships would provide air cover, at least initially. Two other aircraft, one serving as a command post and a second as the forward air controller, were also involved in missions.

One Special Forces veteran, who participated in Command and Control raids from Danang, said he had taken part in missions in North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. "He said they were for the purpose of gathering intelligence, rescuing other American missions threatened by North Vietnamese forces, destroying supplies and disrupting enemy communications facilities."

Command and Control Central, operating out of Dakto and Kontum, near the tri-border area of South Vietnam and Laos and Cambodia, was used for raids deep within the two latter countries.

"A Special Forces soldier formerly assigned to Command and Control Central said that the group's missions were handled by about 150 Americans and from 300 to 400

Montagnard tribesmen. Men participating in missions first were transported to Dakto and then sent by helicopter across the borders, he said.

"The missions were rotated among the men and casualties were severe, the man said. . . . Such teams usually included two or three American leaders and about half a dozen Montagnards.

"Dakto was the starting point also for large 'hatchet forces,' with larger numbers of Americans and Montagnards. . . .

"Less frequently—apparently only about once every six months—very large groups of Americans were sent across the borders on so-called Slam (Search, locate and annihilate) missions. More than 100 men sometimes participated in such missions. . . .

"Some penetrations into Laos apparently were quite deep. Both the Special Forces (two of Meyer's informants) said the U.S. operated a radio relay station on a mountain top about 30 miles inside Laos.

"This station, called the 'Eagle's Nest,' was used to transmit messages between South Vietnam and Command and Control teams operating beyond the mountain top in the Laotian countryside."

The radio station, whose exact location was not specified, could have been located near the Bolovens plateau, in Southern Laos, where the Pathet Lao told this correspondent in 1970 there was a secret U.S. base. The Pathet Lao liberation forces captured

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N.J. Ex-Green Beret Admits Killing Triple Spy

(Former Green Beret Capt. Robert F. Marasco and seven other Special Forces members were involved in one of the major controversies of the Vietnam War in 1969 when accused of murdering a triple agent. Now a civilian in Bloomfield, he spent many hours being interviewed by Daily Journal reporter Thomas Michalski, recalling events surrounding the assassination that he says never were made public).

By THOMAS MICHALSKI
Journal Staff Writer

Former Green Beret Capt. Robert F. Marasco said he and other Special Forces personnel were involved in clandestine cross border intelligence operations in Cambodia as far back as 1968. That fact is actually irrelevant, however, in that small units of U.S. military and the Central Intelligence Agency have been operating "unwritten about" sorties into both Cambodia and Laos for several years previous to 1968.

But Marasco and seven other Green Berets were accused by the Army with the June 1969 "elimination" of Thai Khac Chuyen, a triple agent who jointly served the U.S., North Vietnam and South Vietnam governments as a spy. This came directly as a result of "out-of-country" operations.

Chuyen, Marasco told The Daily Journal was not "properly checked out" by American intelligence officials

Cambodia and Laos during 1968-69.

The case blossomed into an emotion-laden controversy that touched Congress, the secretaries of the Army and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and President Nixon himself.

Marasco was charged with pumping two bullets into Chuyen's head before his body was dumped into the shark-infested South China Sea. It was an act which Marasco has since freely admitted.

The case, however, was dropped after a public outcry and CIA refusal to provide witnesses for a proposed Army court marshal of the seven.

That announcement came in September 1969 from then-Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor and, according to White House Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler, the decision was "approved" by President Nixon.

Marasco said he "no longer feels constrained from making disclosures which will clear the facts and show that all of us involved acted with honor and in the best interests of our country."

With the war in Southeast Asia now apparently coming to an end, Marasco disclosed in detail several incidents leading up to Chuyen's assassination.

He spoke of the highly secret "Project Gamma," how and why the Berets were charged with murder, and conspiracy, the reasons why they were eventually set free, and of an incredible escape plan.

To begin this story one must understand Marasco himself. Now 30, a mod dresser, and a partner in his father's Bloomfield insurance agency, Marasco is quiet, intelligent, cool and calculating.

"I am not and never was a

killer," he says. "What I did in Vietnam was a job . . . for the best interests of my country."

Marasco's first wife was a college professor, "a staunch anti-war, but not necessarily anti-Vietnam war type. She was a pacifist. And a leader of the anti-war movement at her university at the time. To be married to a Green Beret, it just didn't go together.

"Of course," he said, "just having been in the service alone didn't go. Being a Green Beret compounded it and then, of course, the 'incident' compounded it more."

After his graduation from Bloomfield High School, Marasco went on to Fairleigh-Dickinson University where, in 1962, he earned a business administration degree.

Marasco went into the insurance field to get background in underwriting, claims adjusting and sales.

"I ultimately wanted to work for my father," he said. "But I wanted to be able to offer something to his agency, not just being the boss' son."

In 1966 Marasco, at 24, received his Army draft notice.

"I went to the recruiter and had him convince me why it would be worth my while to enlist and give him an extra year," he explained. "We came to an agreement that I would go into the counter-intelligence corps as an enlisted man."

Marasco admits today that he enlisted "because I wanted to stay out of the infantry."

He went to Fort Dix in March 1966 where he was called "Pappy" because of his age. "I was older than my drill sergeant," he recalled.

The next stop was Fort Holabird in Baltimore for counter-intelligence training. Marasco then volunteered for

Officer's Candidate School and went to Fort Benning, Ga.

"After six months at OCS I didn't want to go back to intelligence," he said. "I felt the Army was taking the best officer candidates and putting them in the soft branches like intelligence, transportation and the quartermaster corps."

"The best men were going to all other fields, and it seemed like they were putting the worst officers in the infantry," he said. "This should not have been because the infantry is the most important branch in the Army."

Despite his feelings voiced only moments earlier about serving in the infantry, Marasco said at this point, "I thought I could be a good infantry officer . . . I just wanted to stay in the infantry . . . they (the Army) wouldn't let me because of my central intelligence training."

In April 1967 Marasco was commissioned a second lieutenant and went back to Fort Holabird for additional training. He then was assigned to an intelligence unit in Washington.

"I met the assignments captain there," Marasco recalled. "I prevailed upon him to send me to Vietnam because that was the only way you could get out of any unit at the time."

Before going to Southeast Asia, Marasco went to parachute school and other schools required by the Special Forces.

"My assignment was to Fifth Special Forces Group (Green Berets) in South Vietnam," Marasco said. "But I was diverted to the 101st Airborne Division where I stayed for six or seven months."

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before his assignment as a principal agent for the Fifth Special Forces Group in

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Viet Prisoner-Rescue Unit to Be Disbanded

Fate of Secret Squad Parallels That of Other Clandestine Operations in S.E. Asia

BY GEORGE McARTHUR

Times Staff Writer

SAIGON—A secret command of American soldiers specially trained for prisoner rescue raids in hostile territory is scheduled to be disbanded some time this month.

According to an officer long involved in clandestine operations, the move will take from the U.S. command in South Vietnam its last cloak-and-dagger outfit specifically honed to fight its way in and out of prisoner camps.

(The secret unit being disbanded was trained for use in the jungles of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and not for such spectaculars as the unsuccessful raid on Son Tay in North Vietnam in November, 1970.)

Scattered Around

Though there are plenty of toughly skilled Americans in South Vietnam to mount such raids if the chance arises, they are scattered among many units. There are also small outfits — like Navy seal teams — available for such things, but they are not specifically trained and kept in readiness for prisoner rescue grabs.

Consequently the stand-down of the secret prisoner rescue group has stirred heated words within the headquarters of U.S. Gen. Creighton W. Abrams.

Abrams, who has an ill-concealed suspicion of the value of elite units superimposed on the Army's regular structure, has reportedly resisted arguments to go lightly on the withdrawal of such outfits.

Since the prisoner rescue unit was formed after the big influx of American troops in 1965-66 it has not succeeded in res-

cuing a single American prisoner held by the Viet Cong, though it has helped snatch a small number of South Vietnamese captives from jungle camps.

The unit had a parallel mission of saving downed pilots in cases where ground commandos might be required in addition to the crews of Air Force rescue helicopters known as Jolly Green Giants. If any such operation was ever mounted it has not been revealed. Some officers hint, however, that some operations of this type took place.

Not Many Captives

One reason the unit has few successes to its credit is that it was used sparingly and under the strictest limitations. To avoid endangering the lives of any captives with "fishing expeditions," special raids were ordered only when intelligence turned up hard and immediate information on the location of Viet Cong POW camps. Thus, while the unit had few successes it could equally boast few failures in the sense of botched or sloppy efforts.

The number of American captives in Viet Cong camps is also very small. Casualty figures list 463 Americans missing in South Vietnam. The United States claims 78 of these were known from various sources to have been alive at the time of their capture and were consequently listed as war prisoners. Of these, however, only 20 have been acknowledged by Viet Cong propaganda broadcasts as prisoners.

The justification for the

special prisoner-rescue commando of a relative handful of men is therefore small in the face of the overall troop withdrawal demands—the U.S. force level is now 127,000 men and the current goal is 69,000 by May 1.

The withdrawal, however, underscores the unpublicized decline in all clandestine operations which has paralleled the pullout of regular troops.

CIA Cutback

This actually began about 1969 when the Central Intelligence Agency began to sharply trim its involvement in many programs. Part of this was caused by Abrams, who disliked having Army types under CIA command as was the case in several areas. At any rate, the CIA began to withdraw provincial agents from the Phoenix program—aimed at rooting out and killing Viet Cong "Phantom government" officials—and quit funding (and controlling) such programs as the training school at Vung Tau which turned out government Revolutionary Development cadre.

Though the CIA's tentacles still reach all the sensitive areas of control in South Vietnam, the emphasis now is less on "operational" areas and more on pure intelligence gathering.

Paralleling the CIA's appreciably lower silhouette, the Green Beret troopers of the 5th Special Forces Group were pulled out a year ago—their clandestine operations being absorbed by an outfit known as SOG—the Studies and Observations Group. SOG is a cloak-and-dagger grabbag at Abrams' headquarters, incorporating a dozen or so outfits which do everything from super-secret long-range patrols to analyzing documents and interrogating top-rank prisoners.

Less Visible

The operations of SOG are noticeably less visible today than they were a

few years ago when a subsidiary unit known as the B-57 Detachment precipitated what became known as the Green Beret case. That case — which involved the execution of a suspected double agent — blew the cover on how extensive clandestine operations had grown in South Vietnam. It also caused a number of heads to roll within the U.S. establishment and resulted in a general hunkering down of cloak-and-dagger types.

Military spokesmen say that a number of SOG personnel have been dribbling out for several months. Its future will probably be sharply diminished within the next several months when the troop withdrawal program enters its final phase.

Paralleling these declines in the "secret war" is the increased use of sensors and computers requiring fewer men in the field and more brainpower at headquarters.

Long-range patrols into Cambodia, Laos and even North Vietnam have been virtually eliminated by the seeding of the Ho Chi Minh Trail with electronic sensors. Much of the computerized analysis on the readouts from these sensors is now done from a secret Air Force establishment in Thailand and not in South Vietnam (though the results are still channeled into 7th Air Force headquarters at Tan Son Nhut where the air war continues to be run).

While clandestine operations on the ground have lessened, the Air Force has also cut the number of planes that were part of the "secret war." These planes were in conglomerate outfits known as special operations squadrons. They included everything from helicopters for dropping penetration agents to radio-packed executive jets equipped to pick up agents deep in enemy land. The squadrons also

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When Britain pulled out of Rhodesia after the 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence, the CIA worked to ferret out details of the sanction-busting. In the popular traditions of spying, secret documents disguised were used to convey messages in invisible ink. It was a shock when one of the informers was a prominent lawyer. But it was not until the CIA had expanded into an area where the British were not active in Egypt, Iran and Syria. E. H. COOKRIDGE ends his column and looks at the Director, Richard Helms

DEAD LETTERS IN SALISBURY

MANY of the bright young men Allen Dulles had recruited to CIA from law offices and universities had gained their spurs in London, where they were sent to glean some of the methods of the British Secret Intelligence Service. Dulles enjoyed making wisecracks about the Victorian and Indian Army traditions still surviving in the British secret service, but he had a healthy respect for its unrivalled experience and great professionalism. He knew that CIA could learn a lot from the British about operations in the Middle East and Africa, where its stations were rapidly expanding.

After Archibald Roosevelt, one of CIA's foremost "Arabists", had restored cordial relations with SIS when station head in London, a plan of co-operation was devised for Africa, where most of the former British colonies had gained independence, and were becoming subject to strong Soviet and Chinese pressure. Roosevelt was still in London when, in 1965, Rhodesia made her momentous "Unilateral Declaration of Independence" (UDI), which led to the conflict with the British Government.

There is no better instance of the strengthening of CIA-SIS collaboration than the hitherto undisclosed story of the services CIA rendered the British authorities in Rhodesia, particularly since about 1968.

Indeed, in assisting the British SIS in its thankless task of implementing the policy of economic sanctions against the Smith regime, CIA put its relations with the Portuguese in jeopardy. It has an enduring understanding with the Portuguese Government and its PIDE secret service on many aspects: NATO security, anti-communist operations, the use of radio stations in Portugal and her colonies, and of bases for the U-2 spy planes and Special Forces in Angola, Mozambique and Macao. However thin the

British sanction policy became, British consular offices and SIS men were supposed to watch the steady flow of Rhodesian pig-iron, tobacco, and other products through the Portuguese ports of Lorenzo Marques and Beira in East Africa to Europe and the Far East. Merchants and shippers there had made fortunes out of the traffic which the Portuguese were bound, by United Nations resolutions and agreements with Britain, to regard as illegal.

After the closure of British missions in Salisbury all information about Rhodesian exports dried up at source. At this juncture CIA stepped in to assist the British. It was not merely a labour of love. American tobacco syndicates in Virginia, Georgia, North and South Carolina, Tennessee and Kentucky greatly increased their production and sales to Europe when Rhodesian tobacco growers lost most of their trade through sanctions. Traditionally, Rhodesian tobacco was used for cigar and cigarette manufacture in Belgium, Holland, Germany and Switzerland. When these supplies dried up, European manufacturers turned to American growers. But by and by Rhodesian exports began to flow again, by the use of false certificates of origin and smuggling through the Portuguese ports and through Durban in South Africa, much to the displeasure of the Americans.

Thus, obliging the British and helping American business, CIA ordered its agents to ferret out the secrets of the sanction-busting schemes devised by Mr Ian Smith's regime. Soon the CIA station in Salisbury was bustling with activity. Since 1962 it had been headed by Richard La Macchia, a senior CIA official, who had joined it in 1952 from the State Department and had come to Africa in the guise of an official of the U.S. Development Aid Agency.

Other CIA men were Cape Town, former A. Francis M. who had a cloak-and-dagger life in Cuba and Congo and several of the most famous, Edward Salisbury.

From 1957 from the State Department, from 1959 he headed the East and South African section and, at the time of his new appointment, was Station Head in Pretoria. Among his various exploits he was reputed to have initiated the first contacts between the South African government and Dr Banda of Malawi.

The CIA agents were perpetually journeying between Salisbury and the Mozambique ports, and Murray was temporarily posted to Lusaka to maintain personal contact with British officials resident in Zambia. Mr Ian Smith and his cabinet colleague, Mr J. H. Howman, who looks after foreign affairs as well as security and the secret service of the Rhodesian regime, were not unaware of the unwelcome operations of the Americans. They suffered them for the sake of avoiding an open clash with Washington. Their patience, however, became frayed when it was discovered that secret documents had disappeared from the headquarters of the ruling Rhodesian National Front Party. Subsequently,

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THE CIA—An Attack and a Reply

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A FORMER CIA EXECUTIVE DEFENDS ITS OPERATIONS

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Just how valid are the charges against the Central Intelligence Agency? What guarantees do Americans have that it is under tight control? A point-by-point defense of the organization comes from a man who served in top posts for 18 years.

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THE REPLY

Following is an analysis of intelligence operations by Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., former executive director-comptroller of the Central Intelligence Agency:

The Central Intelligence Agency was created by the National Security Act of 1947 as an independent agency in the executive branch of the United States Government, reporting to the President. Ever since that date it has been subjected to criticism both at home and abroad for what it has allegedly done as well as for what it has failed to do.

Our most cherished freedoms are those of speech and the press and the right to protest. It is not only a right, but an obligation of citizenship to be critical of our institutions, and no organization can be immune from scrutiny. It is necessary that criticism be responsible, objective and constructive.

It should be recognized that as Americans we have an inherent mistrust of anything secret: The unknown is always a worry. We distrust the powerful. A secret organization described as powerful must appear as most dangerous of all.

It was my responsibility for my last 12 years with the CIA—first as inspector general, then as executive director-comptroller—to insure that all responsible criticisms of the CIA were properly and thoroughly examined and, when required, remedial action taken. I am confident this practice has been followed by my successors, not because of any direct knowledge, but because the present Director of Central Intelligence was my respected friend and colleague for more than two decades, and this is how he operates.

It is with this as background that I comment on the current allegations, none of which are original with this critic but any of which should be of concern to any American citizen.

CIA and the Intelligence System Is Too Big


This raises the questions of how much we are willing to pay for national security, and how much is enough.

First, what are the responsibilities of the CIA and the other intelligence organizations of our Government?

Very briefly, the intelligence system is charged with insuring that the United States learns as far in advance as possible of any potential threats to our national interests. A moment's contemplation will put in perspective what this actually means. It can range all the way from Russian missiles

pointed at North America to threats to U.S. ships or bases, to expropriation of American properties, to dangers to any one of our allies whom we are pledged by treaty to protect. It is the interface of world competition between superior powers. Few are those who have served in the intelligence system who have not wished that there could be some limitation of responsibilities or some lessening of encyclopedic requirements about the world. It is also safe to suggest that our senior policy makers undoubtedly wish that their span of required information could be less and that not every disturbance in every part of the world came into their purview.

(Note: This should not be interpreted as meaning that the U.S. means to intervene. It does mean that when there is a



Mr. Kirkpatrick

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., now professor of political science at Brown University, joined the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947 and advanced to assistant director, inspector general and executive director-comptroller before leaving in 1965. He has written extensively on intelligence and espionage. Among other honors, he holds the President's Award for Distinguished Federal Civilian Service and the Distinguished Intelligence Medal.

boundary dispute or major disagreement between other nations, the U.S. is expected to exert its leadership to help solve the dispute. It does mean that we will resist subversion against small, new nations. Thus the demand by U.S. policy makers that they be kept informed.)

What this means for our intelligence system is worldwide coverage.

To my personal knowledge, there has not been an Administration in Washington that has not been actively concerned with the size and cost of the intelligence system. All Administrations have kept the intelligence agencies under tight con-

CIA funded opium traffic, ex-Beret says

By Joe Pilati
Globe Staff

A former Green Beret asserted yesterday that he regularly purchased large quantities of opium in Laos with funds provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.

His testimony came during the final day of "Winter Soldier Investigation II," sponsored by Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) at Boston's Faneuil Hall.

Former Sgt. Paul Withers, 24, a Springfield native now living in Cambridge, told 300 persons: "When I was in Laos in 1966, one of my main functions was to buy opium from Meo tribesmen, using CIA funds."

He said his orders to buy opium "came down from a contact man" from the CIA and were "only verbal, never on paper." Payment to the Meo tribesmen was made in "gold and silver, which came in on an agency plane," he added.

Withers said opium pickups at a small base camp in northern Laos, which he and two other Green Berets built, were made by "Air America" planes. "It was Americans who picked up the opium" in its raw, unprocessed form, he said.

A report in July by two House Foreign Affairs Committee members, Reps. Robert Steele (D-Conn.) and Morgan Murphy (D-Ill.), alleged that "Air America" aircraft, contracted by the CIA, have been used to transport opium from northern Laos into the capital city of Vientiane and that, once

processed, the drugs are flown into South Vietnam aboard both military and civilian aircraft.

The congressmen's report also alleged that both the Laotian army commander, Gen. Ouan Rathikoun, and South Vietnamese Premier Tran Thien Khiem are involved in the corruption of customs agents and drug trafficking.

Withers said that, after completing basic training at Fort Dix in the fall of 1965, he was sent to Nha Trang, South Vietnam. Although he was "ostensibly" stationed there, he said he was placed "on loan" to the CIA in January 1966 with orders to help "train and equip Meo tribesmen in counterinsurgency" against Pathet Lao guerrillas.

The training was "in fact the main part of my job" in Laos, Withers said, but "there were never fewer than two opium pickups a week" during the year he served there.

Withers said that, after receiving language training in various Southeast Asian dialects while at Nha Trang, he was "stripped of my uniform and all American credentials" before going to Laos.

He said the CIA "wouldn't even let me write my own letters. They gave me blank sheets of paper and told me to sign at the bottom. Then the agency typed out letters sent to my parents and my girlfriend."

Discharged last December after post-Laos service in Cambodia and South Vietnam, Withers was

awarded nine Purple Hearts, the Distinguished Service Cross and Silver and Bronze Stars.

He said he spoke about his involvement in opium trafficking to Sens. Mike Gravel (D-Alaska) and George McGovern (D-S.D.) and to aides of Sens. John Stennis (D-Miss.) and William Fulbright (D-Ark.) in June but was not aware of any subsequent action taken by the legislators.

He said FBI and Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) agents had visited him "three or four times, most recently about a month and a half ago in Cambridge," to question him about his allegations. He said his mother in Springfield and his wife, now living in South Hadley, had also been questioned.

Another participant in yesterday's VVAW panels, Charles Knight of the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, called opium "the largest export commodity in the Laotian economy" and commented: "In this sense, it is not at all strange that the CIA should aid and protect its transport."

Other testimony included statements by Indochina veterans who said they were former or current heroin addicts.

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
AROUND THE WORLD

I. ANDRONOV

PROVING GROUND

FOR THE GUAM

DOCTRINE



CAMBODIA is a comparatively recent victim of American imperialist aggression in Indo-China—U.S. forces invaded it only last year. The political prologue, it may be said, was the Guam doctrine—the new course in Asia proclaimed by President Nixon two years ago at the U.S. air force base in Guam. As put by Nixon himself, the point of this doctrine is that the United States must play a substantial role in Asia but would like the problem of war and the responsibility for it to be assumed in ever greater degree by the Asian countries themselves. In the opinion of many Asian public leaders and publications the veiled meaning of this is that Washington wants to "pit Asians against Asians," that is, to have its war in Asia fought by others in the selfish interests of the U.S. ruling element. The tempestuous events of the

last eighteen months in the once tranquil country of Cambodia offer a classic example of how this is worked in practice.

YANKIES IN PNOM PENH

Washington makes no secret now of its massive bomb strikes against vast areas of Cambodia, but all its other military operations against Cambodia's patriotic forces are painstakingly camouflaged by its official representatives in the Cambodian capital. This summer, for instance, quite a few groups of American servicemen were flown into Pnom Penh from Saigon, but in each case they were dressed as civilians. Thus "camouflaged," the visitors were then deposited in various parts of the country by U.S. Embassy helicopters. This operation, directed by the Pentagon and the CIA, is kept secret from American and world public opinion. What is more, it is conducted in defiance of the ban imposed by the U.S. Congress on American land operations in Cambodia. But in Pnom Penh itself, it is widely known that the Pentagon's "special forces" units—the notorious Green Berets—systematically make raids deep into the interior of guerilla areas. Very often they disguise themselves as insurgents. The Green Berets carry out sabotage and terrorist missions in the guerilla areas and pick targets for U.S. bombers.

American army planes can be seen daily in the Pnom Penh airport though their presence is partly concealed: the identification marks on some of the planes have been painted over. Last January guerillas blew up a few American planes in the airport and since then the building has remained half in ruins. The surviving part is roofless and its windows are gaping holes. The wind blows through it freely and the floor is strewn with rubble and plaster. But out on the airfield American military transports and sharp-nosed fighters again come and go.

The road from the airport to the capital is blocked off every three hundred metres by empty petrol barrels, so that no car can speed past. Near these roadblocks are stationed groups of soldiers equipped with American quick-firing rifles and field telephones, and wearing American green tropical uniforms and helmets.

In the city there are coils of barbed wire everywhere. The barbed wire is strung on poles right on the sidewalks in front of all government buildings—whether a post office or a ministry. The more important the office, the more wire there is in front of it. First place is taken by the Defence Ministry: the street it stands on is covered with rows of it, and at its walls are piles of sandbags behind which soldiers stand, by ready to man machine-guns. There are also machine-gun nests at the gates of nearly all government offices. From time to time people calling at them are carefully searched at gun-point. At the press centre a representative of the military command cautions journalists that it is risky to take photographs in the streets—a nervous soldier may open fire without warning. A state of emergency has been declared in the capital, for guerilla units have surrounded it and by night approach its suburbs. No one may enter the city after sunset; all roads are blocked by government soldiers who huddle fearfully around the American M-113 armoured cars placed at their disposal.

Artillery batteries have been mounted even in the centre of the city, on the Mekong embankment, their guns trained on the opposite bank from which guerillas sometimes open up fire with mortars and mobile rocket launchers. From time to time they even blow up a munitions dump right in the city or shower hand grenades on picked targets, such as the Saigon mission. After one such attack the South Vietnam ambassador landed in hospital. A guerilla attack on the arsenal in June caused an explosion of such force that the flames rose 120 metres and the surrounding streets were showered with shell and mine fragments mixed with stone and rubble.

From a white four-storey building on the corner of one of the Pnom Penh boulevards and Avenue Mao Tse-tung, near the Mekong embankment, hangs the American flag. This is the American Embassy building and the Americans occupying it are jestingly called "the Yankees from Mao Street." Recently, though, the street was renamed—either at the request of the American diplomats or because of the change in the political climate of the Cambodian capital.

The American Embassy in Pnom

continued

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Student congress applauds veteran

Ex-Green Beret discloses U.S. guided China incursions

By Trudy Rubin
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Fort Collins, Colo.

The United States Central Intelligence Agency "equipped and directed" incursions by mercenaries into Chinese territory from northern Laos, according to a former Green Beret captain.

Lee Mond, now a student at Newark, N.J., State College and a delegate to the National Student Association Congress here says "no Americans have crossed the Chinese border." However, the CIA recruited ethnic Laos and Chinese for the crossings. In addition, he maintains the CIA "directed reconnaissance missions and monitored operations along the Chinese border."

Emotional speech

Mr. Mond repeated in an interview with the Monitor charges he first aired at a forum on war crimes sponsored by the Vietnam Veterans Against the War as part of the congress last Saturday.

The tall, black veteran of seven years, seven months service who left the Army in June, 1970, after being wounded three times—winner of the Silver Star and three Bronze Stars—struggled with his emotions as he told the cheering NSA delegates on Monday that he had "made up my mind after a year of deliberations to disclose this information because these things were part of an ongoing philosophy of . . . the executive branch of this country."

Mr. Mond said that about 3,000 Chinese were in northern Laos when he was in Thailand from June, 1969, to June, 1970, and that they then controlled the quarter of the country north of the royal capital Luang Prabang.

The majority were engineers, building a north-south road from China to Luang Prabang. He said "studies indicate" that they hoped to push down to Vientiane, the present provisional capital.

Chinese infantry units were in Laos to protect the road builders, he added, and anti-aircraft installations were built in Laos to protect them.

Incursions described

The incursions were aimed at watching Chinese movements.

He said the incursions were made at Lai Chau in the northern tip of Laos and Muong Sing, also in northern Laos, and that the units moved about 50 to 75 kilometers north and northwest into a large open area touching on the town of Lant Sang in Yunan Province in the People's Republic of China.

Mr. Mond said his information was based on studies he had read while serving as a plans officer in Thailand on the U.S. Army general staff and in conversations with military personnel.

He also served with the 101st Airborne in Vietnam.

The former captain cited as one main reason for his disaffection with American policies the massive flood of drugs pouring out of Laos into Thailand and then into the hands of American troops.

Opium smuggling

He charged that the CIA "actively encouraged the growing of poppies, the flower from which opium is made, by Montagnard tribesmen (on the opium rich Plain of Jars) whom the agency recruits as mercenaries."

He later qualified this statement by adding, "perhaps they (CIA) don't always need to encourage them (the Montagnards) to grow poppies because it is so lucrative." He added, "But I am sure they don't discourage them. If they cut off this source of income, they would have to support the tribesmen far beyond what they are paying them now."

Mr. Mond also charged that the opium is often flown illicitly to major populations in Laos by Air America, a private airline said to be controlled by the CIA. "Opium comes out of the Plain of Jars catch as catch can," he said in an interview with the Monitor, "but from Moung Suoi, a major CIA base which has an airstrip, . . . I am aware that pilots would fly it down to Vientiane for their own profit."

Planes carry drugs

He said he "knew" that Air America was flying opium from Vientiane to Udon Thant on the southern Lao border from where it would be transported to Bangkok and perhaps on to the United States. He said that the base at Udon had one of the biggest drug problems of any U.S. base.

Mr. Mond said he could not say whether

added "it is inconceivable that this much opium could be transported on American aircraft without their superiors knowing it."

Mr. Mond said he had never personally witnessed such shipments. However, he said, that while he was in Bangkok doing research for his study on Thailand "I talked with several young Air America pilots. They had been helicopter or fixed-wing pilots in Vietnam—and they told me that the drug trade from Vientiane to Bangkok was vast. They indicated that it was being flown in. I took it for granted that since they were relating this, they had firsthand knowledge."

While in Thailand Mr. Mond's unhappiness with the drug problem led him to write a letter in April, 1970, to the commander of U.S. Army Support Forces in Thailand in which he indicated that between 10 and 15 percent of the junior enlisted men on his base used hard drugs daily.

He also initiated a drug rehabilitation program on his base.

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THE GUARDIAN August 14 1971

American Intelligence faked a broadcast in Prince Sihanouk's voice in its latest attempt to regain influence in Cambodia: I. D. Allman reports from Phnom Penh on the dangerous rivalry between the CIA and the American State and Defence Departments.

US infighting

While the armies of Phnom Penh and Saigon fight the forces of Hanoi for control of Cambodia, another war is being fought for the same territory by another set of allies against another infiltrator from the north. The other co-belligerents are the American Departments of State and Defence—like Cambodia and South Vietnam, hardly natural allies. The invader that has brought them together, to use President Nixon's phrase, is the Central Intelligence Agency.

The CIA, like the North Vietnamese, were supposed to have been deprived of their Cambodian enclaves last year, about the time of the US-South Vietnamese invasion, when the White House ordered that the post-invasion US role in Cambodia be as above-board as possible. Both criteria seemed to rule out the CIA, but both the North Vietnamese and the CIA keep trying to encroach on Cambodia from their secret outposts in southern Laos.

Whereas Hanoi's South Laotian base is known as the Ho Chi Minh

Trail, the CIA's is called the "Annex." It is a white, multi-storeyed building in the Laotian Mekong river town of Pakse. The building looks like every other building in Pakse—except that it has no windows, is covered with antennae instead of tropical trees, and can be entered only by plugging the right combination on an electronic keyboard lock.

The CIA's latest Cambodian excursion recently was limited by an enterprising Phnom Penh-based American correspondent named Boris Baczynskyj, who discovered nothing less than a CIA plot to synthesise Prince Norodom Sihanouk's imitatively squeaky voice, and broadcast it over the border into Cambodia. The venture was not only an attempt to dislodge the Prince by pouring words into his mouth, but also an effort to win away a few Cam-

bodian hearts and minds from the State and Defence departments.

Unfortunately for the CIA, Baczynskyj, a Khmer-speaking ex-Peace Corps Volunteer, noticed a considerable difference in the words of Sihanouk as beamed over Radio Peking, and the statements attributed to him by the Phnom Penh Government. After months of checking, he verified the existence of the clandestine Pakse Radio, and established the identity of its operators.

Baczynskyj's discovery, however, was more than a journalistic coup. It revealed the latest in a series of failed CIA attempts to maintain cover for its Cambodian operations, which are bitterly resented by the foreign service and military officers who predominate here. The agency, in fact, has been trying rather unsuccessfully to regain a piece of the Cambodian action ever since 1963, when Prince Sihanouk sent the US aid mission packing, which had served as the agency's main Cambodian cover.

The Green Beret scandal in Vietnam, for example, grew out of a CIA order to eliminate with extreme prejudice one of its Cambodian operatives. The agency also supported anti-Sihanouk insurgents, even when the State Department was trying for a Cambodian rapprochement in the late 1960s.

Several times burned, the State Department, when it resumed diplomatic relations with Cambodia in 1969, tried to make sure there would be no CIA agents in the embassy woodpile. Even now, ostensibly, there is no CIA component at all in the 100-man US mission in Phnom Penh.

Never daunted, the CIA has kept up its efforts to develop its own Cambodian infiltration routes, trying to stay out of the Cam-

bodian political crisis, the Agency unbeknown to the diplomats, relayed promises of support to the anti-Sihanouk faction. And as soon as the Cambodian war broke out, Agency-run teams of Laotian mercenaries began ranging down into Cambodia on "intelligence patrols," which the Pakse station hoped would be the landing parties for a whole CIA-run Clandestine Army in Cambodia.

The American sibling rivalry, which might otherwise be as amusing as a nineteenth-century brouhaha between Whitehall and Simla over jurisdiction of some Indian Ocean atoll, already is producing some unedifying complications.

The CIA's Pakse operations—which for all their ingenuity so far have failed to keep the Communists from taking over most of South Laos—are flagrant violations of Laotian neutrality. And neither Laos's premier, Prince Souvanna Phouma, who is a northerner, nor the US Embassy in faraway Vientiane, seems able to curb the Pakse operation.

Here in Cambodia, where the US embassy has become the nexus of Cambodian political power, the American infighting has already produced some domestic political complications—notably affecting the much publicised rivalry between Premier-delegate Sisowath Sirik Matak and Marshal Lon Nol's young and ambitious brother, Lon Non. The embassy likes Sirik Matak, and hardly bothers to veil its distaste for Lon Non.

With Sirik Matak, who has shunned CIA contacts, emerging as the embassy's man, and Lon Non emerging as the CIA protégé, the American squabble seems to contain seeds potentially as disastrous as those that disrupted Laos a decade ago. At that time, the CIA so disliked the State Department's candidate for premier of Laos that it sent its own Laotian army marching north to drive him out of Vientiane.

Several times routed in its efforts to infiltrate Cambodia, the CIA, like Hanoi, may decide on a strategy of letting discussion spring up among its adversaries. The State Department wants to keep the Cambodian operation lean, clean, and honest. The Defence Department keeps pushing for a big in-country US military establishment.

"You might say we're caught in the middle," said one foreign service officer recently, empathising with the Cambodians who are similarly caught between North and South Vietnam.

STATINTL

WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS

The Theory and Fallacies of

Counterinsurgency

STATINTL

EGBAL AHMAD

From the beginning, the core of the tragedy in Southeast Asia has been the inability of Western political leaders, and particularly American political leaders, to grasp the nature of insurgency in areas formerly under colonial rule, or the limitations of counterinsurgency to quell it. Accordingly, The Nation is devoting almost this entire issue to Egbal Ahmad's essay on the subject. In somewhat different form it will be a chapter in his forthcoming Reaction and Revolution in the Third World (Pantheon). Mr. Ahmad is a Fellow of the Adlai Stevenson Institute in Chicago.

To write on counterinsurgency one must first explain what the so-called "insurgencies" really are. In the United States that may be difficult because for the most part the social scientists who write on revolutionary warfare have been proponents of counterinsurgency. As a result, the biases of incumbents are built into the structure, images and language of contemporary Western, especially American, literature on the subject. We have come to accept ideologically contrived concepts and words as objective descriptions.

One could take innumerable examples—terrorism, subversion, pacification, urbanization, protective reaction, defensive interdiction, etc.—and expose the realities behind these words and phrases. The term counterinsurgency is itself an excellent example. Like all coinages in this area, it is value-laden and misleading. In fact, counterinsurgency is not at all directed against insurgency, which Webster defines as "a revolt against a government, not reaching the proportions of an organized revolution; and not recognized as belligerency." The truth is, the Congress and the country would be in uproar if the government were to claim that U.S. counterinsurgency capabilities could conceivably be available to its clients for putting down "revolts not reaching the proportions of an organized revolution." The truth is the opposite: counterinsurgency is a multifaceted assault against organized revolutions. The euphemism is not used by accident, nor from ignorance. It serves to conceal the reality of a foreign policy dedicated to combating revolutions abroad; it helps to relegate revolutionaries to the status of outlaws. The reduction of a revolution to mere insurgency is also an implicit denial of its legitimacy. In this article, counterinsurgency and counterrevolution are used interchangeably.

Analytically, counterinsurgency may be discussed in terms of two primary models—the conventional-establishment and the liberal-reformist; and two ancillary models—the punitive-militarist and the technological-attributive. I term these latter ancillary because they develop after the fact—from actual involvement in counterrevolution, and from interplay between the conventional and liberal institutions and individuals so involved. The models, though identifiable in terms of the intensity and

scope of their application at given times, and in terms of the agencies and individuals favoring them, are operationally integrated in the field. I outline them here:

Although monolithic in its goal of suppressing revolutions, the theory and practice of counterinsurgency reflects the pluralism of the Western societies to which most of its practitioners and all of its theoreticians belong. A pluralistic, bargaining political culture induces an institutionalized compulsion to compromise. Within a defined boundary, there can be something for everyone. Hence, the actual strategy and tactics of counterinsurgency reflect compromise, no one blueprint being applied in its original, unadulterated form. This give-and-take contributes to a most fateful phenomenon of counterrevolutionary involvement: groups and individuals continue to feel that their particular prescriptions were never administered in full dosage and at the right intervals. They show a tendency toward self-justification, a craving to continue with and improve their formulas for success. Severe critics of specific "blunders" and "miscalculations," they still persist in seeing "light at the end of the tunnel." I shall return to this in discussing the Doctrine of Permanent Counterinsurgency.

Set Battles; 'Liberal' Doctrine

We might view the conventional-establishment approach as constituting the common denominator of the assumptions and objectives shared by all incumbents; viz., an *a priori* hostility toward revolution, the view that its origins are conspiratorial, a managerial attitude toward it as a problem, and a technocratic-military approach to its solution. In strategy and tactics, this approach prefers conventional ground and air operations, requiring large deployments of troops, search-and-destroy missions (also called "mop-up operations"), the tactics of "encirclement" and "attrition"—which involve, on the one hand, large military fortifications (bases, enclaves) connected by "mobile" battalions (in Vietnam, helicopter-borne troops and air cavalry); and, on the other hand, massive displacement of civilian population and the creation of free-fire zones. The conventionalists also evince deep longings for set battles, and would multiply the occasions by forcing, surprising or luring the guerrillas into conventional showdowns. The results of these pressures are bombings (e.g., North Vietnam) or invasion of enemy "sanctuaries" across the frontiers of conflict (e.g., Cambodia) and the tactic of offering an occasional bait in the hope of luring the enemy to a concentrated attack (e.g., Dienbienphu, Khe Sanh).

If the conventional-establishment attitudes constitute the lowest common denominator of counterrevolution, the liberal-reformists are the chief exponents of its doctrine, and the most sophisticated programmers of its practice. They provide the core of the policies specifically associated

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STATINTL

A SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT:

Kennedy's Private War

Ralph L. Stavins

The article that follows is part of *The Planning of the Vietnam War*, a study by members of the Institute of Policy Studies in Washington, including Richard J. Barnet, Marcus Raskin, and Ralph Stavins.* In their introduction to the study, the authors write:

"In early 1970, Marcus Raskin conceived the idea of a study that would explain how the Vietnam disaster happened by analyzing the planning of the war. A group of investigators directed by Ralph Stavins concentrated on finding out who did the actual planning that led to the decisions to bomb North Vietnam, to introduce over a half-million troops into South Vietnam, to defoliate and destroy vast areas of Indochina, and to create millions of refugees in the area.

"Ralph Stavins, assisted by Cantu Plan, John Berkowitz, George Pipkin, and Brian Eden, conducted more than 300 interviews in the course of this study. Among those interviewed were many Presidential advisers to Kennedy and Johnson, generals and admirals, middle level bureaucrats who occupied strategic positions in the national security bureaucracy, and officials, military and civilian, who carried out the policy in the field in Vietnam.

"A number of informants backed up their oral statements with documents in their possession, including informal minutes of meetings, as well as portions of the official documentary record now known as the 'Pentagon Papers.' Our information is drawn not only from the Department of Defense, but also from the White House, the Department of State, and the Central Intelligence Agency."

The study is being published in two volumes. The first, which includes the article below, will be published early in August. The second will appear in May, 1972.

*The study is the responsibility of its authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute, its trustees, or fellows.

At the end of March, 1961, the CIA circulated a National Intelligence Estimate on the situation in South Vietnam. This paper advised Kennedy that Diem was a tyrant who was confronted with two sources of discontent, the non-Communist loyal opposition and the Viet Cong. The two problems were closely connected. Of the spreading Viet Cong network the CIA noted:

Local recruits and sympathetic or intimidated villagers have enhanced Viet Cong control and influence over increasing areas of the countryside. For example, more than one-half of the entire rural region south and southwest of Saigon, as well as some areas to the north, are under considerable Communist control. Some of these areas are in effect denied to all government authority not immediately backed by substantial armed force. The Viet Cong's strength encircles Saigon and has recently begun to move closer in the city.

The people were not opposing these recent advances by the Viet Cong; if anything, they seemed to be supporting them. The failure to rally the people against the Viet Cong was laid to Diem's dictatorial rule:

There has been an increasing disposition within official circles and the army to question Diem's ability to lead in this period. Many feel that he is unable to rally the people in the fight against the Communists because of his reliance on virtual one-man rule, his tolerance of corruption extending even to his immediate entourage, and his refusal to relax a rigid system of public controls.

The CIA referred to the attempted coup against Diem that had been led by

General Thi in November, 1960, and concluded that another coup was likely. In spite of the gains by the Viet Cong, they predicted that the next attempt to overthrow Diem would originate with the army and the non-Communist opposition.

The Communists would like to initiate and control a coup against Diem, and their armed and subversive operations including united front efforts are directed toward this purpose. It is more likely, however, that any coup attempt which occurs over the next year or so will originate among non-Communist elements, perhaps a combination of disgruntled civilian officials and oppositionists and army elements, broader than those involved in the November attempt.

In view of the broadly based opposition to Diem's regime and his virtual reliance on one-man rule, it was unlikely that he would initiate any reform measures that would sap the strength of the revolutionaries. Whether reform was conceived as widening the political base of the regime, which Diem would not agree to, or whether it was to consist of an intensified counter-insurgency program, something the people would not support, it had become painfully clear to Washington that reform was not the path to victory. But victory was the goal, and Kennedy called upon Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric to draw up the victory plans. On April 20, 1961, Kennedy asked Gilpatric to:

- a) Appraise the current status and future prospects of the Communist drive to dominate South Vietnam.
- b) Recommend a series of actions (military, political, and/or economic, overt and/or covert) which will prevent Communist domination of that country.

CIA 104 Lansdale & Edwards
SOC. 4.01.2 The Planning of
the Vietnam War

Rostow Says Kennedy Feared a Larger War

Former White House adviser Walt W. Rostow says President John F. Kennedy told him late in 1961 that an American withdrawal from Vietnam would not bring peace but would lead to a larger and possibly nuclear war.

Rostow, who was also an adviser in the Johnson administration and is now a member of the University of Texas faculty, said yesterday on CBS television that Kennedy "understood deeply, all the way down to the flattest statement ever made of the 'domino theory,' why Southeast Asia and its preservation as an independent area was vital to the American interest, including something which is often forgotten: its relationship to the Indian subcontinent, through Burma."

Rostow defended Johnson, saying he did not attempt to deceive the American people "and what went on in 1964 was contingency planning."

LBJ Gave Clues

Daniel Ellsberg, who gave to the press copies of the classified Pentagon study of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, said on ABC that it was "very misleading" to conclude that Johnson deceived the voters during the 1964 campaign.

"What Johnson said was, 'I'm not going to send American boys now' or, 'I'm not going to send American boys until they're needed,'" Ellsberg said. "So President Johnson may have been giving us some clues back then."

Ellsberg also said that Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's national security affairs adviser, was wrong in saying he was unaware of the existence of the Pentagon study until he read of it in The New York Times.

Decided in 1969

Ellsberg said he discussed the study with Kissinger last September. "I asked him to read it and he said he already has a copy," said Ellsberg, a former Pentagon and State Department staffer who is now a researcher at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Ellsberg said he decided to release the Defense Department study to the press shortly after the Army dropped charges against eight Green Berets in 1969.

Ellsberg said "a great deal had contributed" to his decision, but the final straw was the announcement that then-Secretary of the Army Stanley Resor was dropping the charges against the Green Berets, allegedly because a trial would reveal too much information concerning the Central Intelligence Agency.

"I knew this was untrue," Ellsberg said. "The White House had made the decision."

He said Resor had dropped the charges on behalf of the Johnson administration, over the protests of the commander of troops in Vietnam, Gen. Creighton Abrams.

The Green Berets were not court-martialed for allegedly executing a suspected Vietnamese double-agent.

"Then I started thinking," Ellsberg said, "this is the system I spent 15 years serving... one that would conceal murder by lying. I decided I can't be part of that anymore. I was tired of those who tell me when I should lie and how I should lie. And very soon after that, I made my decision."

Asks Wiretap Data

In Boston meanwhile, lawyers for Ellsberg asked the federal government to disclose whether any wiretaps were used to gain evidence against him.

They directed the request yesterday to Magistrate Peter Princi, before whom Ellsberg was arraigned when he surrendered to U.S. authorities on a warrant charging him with illegal possession of the secret report.

Ellsberg has since been indicted by a federal grand jury on the charge.

STATINTL

GARDEN CITY, N.Y.
 NEWSDAY
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Final Straw for Ellsberg

Combined News Services

New York--Daniel Ellsberg said yesterday that the truth was not told when former Secretary of the Army Stanley Resor dropped 1969 murder charges against eight Green Berets and that that was a major reason he leaked the pentagon papers to the press.

Ellsberg, 40, a former Pentagon aide and the guest on the ABC-TV "Dick Cavett show," said that "a great deal had contributed" to his decision to give part of the 47-volume study of U.S. involvement in Indochina to the New York Times. But, he said, the case against eight Green Berets charged with the murder of a Vietnamese double agent could be singled out as the final straw. The charges were dropped in 1969.

Ellsberg, also said it was "very misleading" to conclude that President Johnson deceived voters during the 1964 presidential campaign on whether he planned to escalate the Vietnam war.

"What Johnson said was, 'I'm not going to send American boys now,' or, 'I'm not going to send American boys until they're needed,'" Ellsberg said. "So, President Johnson may have been giving us some clues back then." Ellsberg said that the American press

deserved some of the blame for failing to grasp fully what Johnson said. "People hear what they want to hear," Ellsberg said, "and the press helps them."

Regarding the Green Beret case, Ellsberg said, "I was lying in bed reading the paper when I saw the headline: 'Green Beret Case Charges Dropped.'" The article reported that Resor had said that the men could not obtain a fair trial because of their involvement with the Central Intelligence Agency. Ellsberg said that that was not wholly true. There was murder involved and the CIA attachment to the case was used as a reason for dismissal, he said. Gen. Creighton Abrams, who had expressed personal interest in the case, had demanded and been promised an investigation. But Resor, he said, had acted on behalf of the Johnson Administration. "The White House had made the decision. It was the first time a commander had been overruled. Abrams was mad because he was told a lie."

"Then I started thinking," Ellsberg said. "This is the system I spent 15 years serving . . . one that would conceal murder by lying. I decided I can't be part of that any more. I was tired of those who tell me when I should lie and how I should lie. And very soon after that, I made my decision."

SALEM, ORE.

JOURNAL

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Keep the spy types in line

STATINTL

Perhaps the least shocking of the disclosures of the Pentagon papers is the extent to which the United States dabbles behind the scenes in spy-thriller type activities.

The papers show clearly the role the U.S. played in the overthrow of South Vietnamese President Diem. The only unusual aspect of the affair is that many of the details have become public. Normally, the Central Intelligence Agency keeps its tracks well covered.

The Green Berets took a public beating, for example, over the slaying of a Vietnamese, who was described as a double agent. But the CIA, which was accused of being behind the plot, managed to escape with an implied, but not proved, role in the affair.

The disturbing aspect of such activities is the danger that the men who plan and approve them may become hardened to their methods. A guy who doesn't blink at ordering an enemy agent rubbed out, or a government toppled, just might become confused about his proper position in relation to domestic issues. If assassination is an acceptable method for implementing U.S. foreign policy, then why isn't it a perfectly decent approach for taking care of domestic opposition?

Testifying this week before a congressional committee, Atty. Gen. John Mitchell indicated that the U.S. is willing to use whatever means are handy to dry up narcotics traffic.

Mitchell said that the government knows the identities of a number of top Asian officials who are trafficking in narcotics, including some Laotian and South Vietnamese military leaders.

How will the U.S. deal with them, a senator asked. Said Mitchell: "... steps are being taken in some of these countries to eliminate their participation..." in narcotics distribution.

Sen. Edmund Muskie then asked Mitchell if there are plans to eliminate their roles in government, as well as drug trafficking.

"We anticipate we will be able to do

this to the extent our country has jurisdiction or other means of persuasion," Mitchell replied, drawing chuckles from the senators.

The U.S. certainly shouldn't hesitate to apply whatever pressure is necessary to stop the flow of narcotics to servicemen abroad, and to the mainland. The fact that Asians view drugs in a substantially different light than Western nations shouldn't prevent us from insisting that countries we are aiding must respect and cooperate in our efforts to halt the narcotics traffic insofar as it involves Americans.

Even so, we feel a lot more than a little queasy when the attorney general of the United States talks slyly about "other means of persuasion." And when senators chuckle openly over the implication that we're not above a back-alley approach to getting our way, we're more than queasy. We're downright worried.

In Mitchell's case, the statement to the committee fits in with many of his other remarks about the rights of society being more important than individual rights, and too much coddling of criminals, and accusing dissenters of acting like Nazis, etc.

This nation is rooted in the belief that nothing is more important than individual rights. Absolutely nothing. And that means that sometimes society as a whole must suffer to assure the preservation of what the Declaration of Independence calls inalienable rights.

Other nations may not play by the same set of rules. In some, individual liberty isn't even considered a practical concept. But in the United States it is more than a concept, it is the gut issue of survival. Every action — at home or abroad — that compromises our commitment to that position weakens the nation, not strengthens it as some in our leadership seem to believe.

So senators chuckle when the attorney general hints that the end justifies the means. But when they do, they risk chuckling our freedoms — and theirs — into nothingness.

KEY VIETNAM TEXTS THE KENNEDY YEARS

Following are texts of key documents accompanying the Pentagon's study of the Vietnam war, dealing with the Administration of President John F. Kennedy up to the events that brought the overthrow of President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963. Except where excerpting is specified, the documents are printed verbatim, with only unmistakable typographical errors corrected.

U.S. Ambassador's '60 Analysis Of Threats to Saigon Regime

Cablegram from Elbridge Durbrow, United States Ambassador in Saigon, to Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, Sept. 16, 1960.

As indicated our 495 and 538 Diem regime confronted by two separate but related dangers. Danger from demonstrations or coup attempt in Saigon could occur earlier; likely to be predominantly non-Communist in origin but Communists can be expected to endeavor infiltrate and exploit any such attempt. Even more serious danger is gradual Viet Cong extension of control over countryside which, if current Communist progress continues, would mean loss free Viet-nam to Communists. These two dangers are related because Communist successes in rural areas embolden them to extend their activities to Saigon and because non-Communist temptation to engage in demonstrations or coup is partly motivated by sincere desire prevent Communist take-over in Viet-nam.

Essentially [word illegible] sets of measures required to meet these two dangers. For Saigon danger essentially political and psychological measures required. For countryside danger security measures as well as political, psychological and economic measures needed. However both sets measures should be carried out simultaneously and to some extent individual steps will be aimed at both dangers.

Security recommendations have been made in our 539 and other messages, including formation internal security council, centralized intelligence, etc. This message therefore deals with our political and economic recommendations. I realize some measures I am recommending are drastic and would be most [word illegible] for an ambassador to make under normal circumstances. But conditions here are by no means normal.

normal. Diem government is in quite serious danger. Therefore, in my opinion prompt and even drastic action is called for. I am well aware that Diem has in past demonstrated astute judgment and has survived other serious crises. Possibly his judgment will prove superior to ours this time, but I believe nevertheless we have no alternative but to give him our best judgment of what we believe is required to preserve his government. While Diem obviously resented my frank talks earlier this year and will probably resent even more suggestions outlined below, he has apparently acted on some of our earlier suggestions and might act on at least some of the following:

1. I would propose have frank and friendly talk with Diem and explain our serious concern about present situation and his political position. I would tell him that, while matters I am raising deal primarily with internal affairs, I would like to talk to him frankly and try to be as helpful as I can be giving him the considered judgment of myself and some of his friends in Washington on appropriate measures to assist him in present serious situation. (Believe it best not indicate talking under instructions.) I would particularly stress desirability of actions to broaden and increase his [word illegible] support prior to 1961 presidential elections required by constitution before end April. I would propose following actions to President:

2. Psychological shock effect is required to take initiative from Communist propagandists as well as non-Communist oppositionists and convince population government taking effective measures to deal with present situation. To achieve that effect following suggested:

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4. Permit National Assembly wider legislative initiative and area of genuine debate and bestow on it authority to conduct, with appropriate publicity, public investigations of any department of government with right to question officials. This step would have three-fold purpose: (A) find some mechanism for dis-

STATINTL

ADVISERS ON MILITARY

JFK Panel Screened 'Dirty Tricks'

The Kennedy Administration's control over the covert "dirty tricks" of the military and the Central Intelligence Agency was centered in a secret top-level group known as the 303 Committee.

The committee, named for the room in the Executive Office Building where it met, was set up by President Kennedy after the Bay of Pigs fiasco in the spring of 1961 — a situation in which he felt he did not have enough control over the government's intelligence operations.

Original members of the committee were McGeorge Bundy, national security adviser to the President; Deputy Defense Secretary Roswell Gilpatric; Undersecretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, and Richard Helms, then deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Although the name and composition of the group has not previously been made public, the existence of such a high-level group to advise Kennedy on covert operations — what Dean Rusk called "back alley fighting" — has been no secret. In fact, leaders of the Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administrations have all insisted that covert activities are controlled at the very highest levels of the government.

The 303 Committee operated in the shadow of a larger and more public group—the Special Group (Counter Insurgency), which was headed by Kennedy's military adviser, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor and had as its co-chairman the president's brother, Robert F. Kennedy.

According to some reports, the attorney general created a courtroom atmosphere in the weekly meetings of the SGCI and badgered government officials called as "witnesses." But Taylor said such reports were "nonsense," although he described the younger Kennedy as a very active participant in the meetings.

The 303 Committee was largely responsible for the unofficial policy of the government and managed covert operations — most often carried out by the CIA or the Army's Special Forces — throughout the world. The SGCI, on the other hand, was responsible for the open official activities of the government

in responding to the Communist strategy of "wars of national liberation." They were both, in different ways, deeply involved in the growing struggle in Southeast Asia.

Both the 303 Committee and the better known SGCI were created as part of President Kennedy's effort to find a better decision-making apparatus than the rather rigid National Security Council of the Eisenhower days and to assert firmer control over covert activities so as to avoid the embarrassment of another Bay of Pigs.

They were part of a great proliferation of committees in the White House in the administrations of both Kennedy and Lyndon R. Johnson.

"They Came and Went . . ."

In a study of the national security process written for the Institute for Defense Analyses in 1968, Chester L. Cooper, a former White House official, described the situation this way: "There were a bewildering variety of . . . ad hoc groups during the Kennedy and Johnson years, with uncertain charters and fluid missions. They came and went with the ebb and flow of crises. Some have likened them to floating crap games, in which the locale, the stakes, and the players all churned about in perpetual motion."

The biggest game in town during all this period, of course, was the Vietnam situation and both the number of committees and the amount of attention devoted to that part of the world was considerable.

The 303 Committee reportedly gave its approval to four major covert operations involving the U.S. in a secret war in Southeast Asia and begun by Kennedy within six weeks after he assumed office.

They were listed as the training of the Montagnard tribesmen, Operation Farmhand, the DeSoto patrols and the 34a operations.

Sabotage in the North

Operation Farmhand was the first covert program approved by the committee for Vietnam and involved airlifting South Vietnamese into North Vietnam to "commit sabotage, spy and harass the enemy."

Frequently, according to one report, the men would show up drunk or fail to show up at all and were invariably arrested as soon as they landed in the North.

Although started covertly, the training of the Montagnards has long since become well known and they are organized as Civilian Irregular Defense Groups.

The other two covert operations — the DeSoto patrols and the 34a operations — have since become controversial because they were both directly involved in the Tonkin Gulf incident of August 1964 in which two destroyers were attacked by gunboats. The North Vietnamese apparently assumed they were involved in a shelling attack.

Under the DeSoto plan, destroyers were sent close to the shores of North Vietnam and China to gather electronic intelligence. The DeSoto patrols were reportedly approved by the President in 1962 and placed under the Joint Center for Intelligence at the Pentagon.

The 34a operation reportedly did not begin until February, 1964, three months after Johnson had succeeded Kennedy.

Personal OK Required

After the Tonkin incident, the 303 Committee reportedly exerted greater control over activities

by adopting a policy whereby every member was required personally to approve each order of a 34a operation.

Later in the Johnson White House, many of the most important decisions concerning the war were made at the weekly Tuesday luncheons, which brought together the President and his closest top-level advisers.

The SGCI remained in use until 1966, by which time it was almost a general-purpose standing committee. It was replaced then by the new Senior Interdepartmental Group — designed to give the secretary of state clearer authority in directing and coordinating overseas activities.

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Diem Ouster Documents

Printed

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The Chicago Sun-Times today disclosed two memos it said were written in 1963 by State Department aide Roger Hilsman outlining methods by which the United States could encourage and assist a coup against Ngo Dinh Diem, then president of South Vietnam.

The Sun-Times said it had obtained the State Department documents from the Citizens Commission of Inquiry into U.S. War Crimes in Vietnam. It said the documents had been declassified in 1963, but had been "tightly held" by the government.

The paper also said it has obtained some other documents derived from a secret Pentagon study of how the U.S. role in Vietnam escalated. It said the materials are similar to those obtained by the Boston Globe and Washington Post.

The Sun-Times story was written by Morton Kondracke and Thomas B. Ross.

The documents show that President John F. Kennedy decided at a National Security Council meeting in September 1963 to put "escalatory pressure" on Diem to get rid of his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, chief of the secret police, the paper said. The Hilsman memos were written just before that meeting, it said.

Neutralization Seen

Hilsman's first memo, prepared for an Aug. 31 NSC meeting, warned that Diem might move to open "neutralization negotiations" with North Vietnam.

If North Vietnam threatened to intervene on Diem's side, Hilsman recommended, the United States should "let it be known unequivocally that we shall hit the DRV (North Vietnam) with all that is necessary to force it to desist."

If Diem chose to make a last stand, Hilsman urged his superiors to "encourage the coup group to fight the battle to the end and to destroy the palace if necessary to gain victory."

The Hilsman memos and the Pentagon documents illuminate a period of increasing U.S. dissatisfaction with Diem and his

brother-in-law that began May 8 and ended with the Nov. 1 coup in which Diem and Nhu were assassinated.

On May 8, government forces fired on Buddhist celebrators in Hue and there ensued what became known as the Buddhist crisis, in which several priests and nuns burned themselves to death in the streets of major Vietnamese cities.

Pagodas Hit

On Aug. 21, nine days before Hilsman's first memo, government forces under the direction of Nhu and Diem attacked major Buddhist pagodas in Hue and Saigon, killing any monks who resisted.

Leading generals reported to U.S. officials that they feared Diem and Nhu might institute a purge within the military—and perhaps seek an accommodation with North Vietnam.

From the end of August until early October, the secret Pentagon study and Hilsman's second memo reveal, the United States struggled to decide how to keep Diem as president but get rid of Nhu, the paper reported.

Seek New Leaders

A conclusion of the Sept. 17 NSC meeting, for example, was that the best of all possible worlds would be for Diem to stay in power with Nhu out of the picture. After it was determined that Nhu's special forces and not the Army had been responsible for the attacks on the pagodas, the documents make it clear that there was unanimous agreement among Kennedy and his advisers that pressure should be applied on Diem to purge Nhu.

The documents indicate that it was also decided at the NSC meeting to identify and begin cultivating alternative leadership—believed to mean the generals.

The decision was made formal after two alternatives were debated at the Sept. 17 NSC meeting—"escalatory pressure" and "reconciliation," the latter

status quo under Diem and Nhu. The alternatives had been laid out the day before in Hilsman's second memo.

"My own judgment," Hilsman declared, "is that the 'reconciliation' track will not work. I think Nhu has already decided on an adventure. I think he feels that the progress already made in the war and the U.S. material on hand gives him freedom to launch on a course that has a minimum and a maximum goal.

"The minimum goal would be sharply to reduce the American presence . . . and to avoid any meaningful concessions that would go against his mandarin, 'personalist' vision of the future of Vietnam.

His "maximum goal, I would think, would be a deal with North Vietnam for a truce in the war, a complete removal of the U.S. presence and a 'neutralist' or 'Titoist' but still separate South Vietnam."

The "escalatory pressure" track, as it was explained at the Sept. 17 NSC meeting, called for the withdrawal of Agency for International Development support for the Diem regime, the removal of support for Nhu's CIA-backed Special Forces, and an order to Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge to remain aloof from Diem.

Provide Plane

Hilsman's Aug. 30 memo recommended that, if Diem chose to leave the country with his family as pressures against him grew, the United States provide him with a plane but only if he agreed to go to France or another European country.

Hilsman warned that Diem might appeal to French President Charles De Gaulle "for political support for neutralization of Vietnam." Hilsman urged resistance to any such arrangement, adding: "We should point out publicly that Vietnam cannot be effectively neutralized unless the Communists are removed from control of North Vietnam."

"If Diem is started in South Vietnam, we can point to the obvious refusal of South Vietnam to accept a

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2 rightwingers zapped badly in N.J. votes

NEWARK, June 10—Anthony (Tony) Imperiale, ultra-right leader in the North Ward, was dumped by the electorate of his home district this week in his bid for election to the Essex County Democratic Committee.

Joseph Ceres, 27, a political newcomer, won handily by almost three to one, over the self-styled law-and-order candidate, Imperiale, who, as a Republican, was unable to vote for himself.

In another election, in Plainfield, N.J., another right-winger went down to defeat. Former Green Beret Robert Marasco, who recently admitted killing a Vietnamese "spy" in a Vietnam CIA murder scandal, lost a four-man race for the Republican nomination to the City Council. Plainfield is his home town.

KANSAS CITY, MO.

STAR

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A Better Image

Recently the Green Berets have been in bad odor because of their bloody cloak-and-dagger work as the military arm of the CIA. So, in this age of government by press-agentry, it was inevitable that propaganda should be used in an effort to deodorize the G. B. image.

A few months ago press releases began coming out of Ft. Bragg about the "volunteer" work the Green Berets were planning in a neighboring North Carolina village. They would help the police, instruct physical education classes in the schools, maybe build a dispensary—prove themselves nice guys, like the Peace Corps. Apparently, however, that flag didn't catch the breeze, because no further word of the project appeared in the news media. (Perhaps the villagers preferred to choose their own teachers and police officers.)

But the latest public-relations gimmick seems to be working much better. Thirty "volunteer" Green Berets, accompanied by a military press agent, are retracing the route of the Lewis and Clark expedition. As calculated, they are getting publicity at each stop along the way—and the way spans two-thirds of the continent. They are being praised for their "courage" and "backbones" by disgruntled types who frankly long to see all young people regimented into an obedient, close-cropped horde of Myrmidons.

Rather pathetically, they are being admired as well by those who would so like to think of the Indo-China war as some kind of Eagle Scout project, or contact sport for manly youths. How eagerly many of us grab at any fantasy which promises to soothe our collective conscience!

Mary Wolf Beach

Green Beret Claims Role In Plot to Oust Sihanouk


NORFOLK, Va., May 22 (AP)—A Green Beret officer says he took part in a secret mission in 1967 designed to aid in the overthrow of Cambodia's Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot reported in its Sunday editions.

Capt. John McCarthy, 28, who said today he will resign his Army commission in August, said the clandestine operation in Cambodia was directed from South Vietnam by the Central Intelligence Agency, the paper reported.

The mission was known as "Operation Cherry," the paper said, and involved McCarthy, working under cover, and members of the Khmer Serai, a society of Cambodians working to oust Sihanouk.

The Pentagon today denied any knowledge of "Operation Cherry."

McCarthy served two years in a federal prison for the murder of a Cambodian mercenary before his conviction was overturned by a military court of appeals. Reached at home in Arizona Saturday, he



CAPT. JOHN McCARTHY JR.
... alleges CIA operation

refused to elaborate on the newspaper article.

Asked if it was far-fetched to say Cambodians may have been hired for "Operation Cherry," McCarthy said, "No." But he refused further comment. He is now stationed at Ft. Huachuca, Ariz.

Sihanouk was ousted by a Cambodian army coup in March 1970, about a month before American South Vietnamese troops entered the country to hit Communist supply bases.

The U.S. government has consistently denied having anything to do with Sihanouk's downfall.

McCarthy said he is leaving the Army because the government had suppressed defense evidence at his trial.

"I have come to the conclusion that loyalty, silence and faith were to no avail," the Virginian-Pilot quoted him as saying.

Your World

Is This the Same CIA?

By GARY McEOIN

For the first time in at least 10 years, the head of the CIA has spoken publicly about his work. His reason, he explained, was to counter the "persistent and growing body of criticism which questions the need and the propriety for a democratic society to have a Central Intelligence Agency."



I must say I was amazed to learn that such criticism exists. Perhaps the CIA has means of access to domestic public opinion which I lack. But in my constant investigation of the issues raised by the existence and activities of the CIA, this one has never appeared even marginally.

On the contrary, the type of agency which Richard McGarrah Helms described in his talk would be hard to criticize. It has "no police, subpoena or enforcement powers." All it does is to collect facts about situations around the world that may affect the national security of the United States

and to project "likely developments from the facts."

But there it stops, according to Helms. "We not only have no stake in policy debates, but we cannot and must not take sides," he said. "The role of intelligence in policy formulation is limited to providing facts. . . . Our role extends to the estimate function. . . . but not to advocacy."

Apparently Helms has neglected to read President Eisenhower's memoirs, a grave oversight for a collector of facts. In "Mandate for Change" Eisenhower describes in detail the role of Allen Dulles, Helms' predecessor as head of the CIA, in the invasion of Guatemala in 1964 and the overthrow of that country's constitutional government by a mercenary army financed and outfitted by the CIA and private United States interests.

THE INVASION was at the point of failure when the invaders lost their air force in combat. Eisenhower in Washington reviewed the crisis with Henry Holland of the State Department and Allen Dulles. Holland, who in Eisenhower's own words was "the real expert in Latin American affairs," warned of the appalling harm the United States would suffer in Latin American and world opinion if we intervened officially. But Dulles fought him and persuaded Eisenhower to overrule him. The planes were replaced and the Guatemala government was overthrown.

Helms has also disclaimed any infiltration of the academic community. Gunnar Myrdal, the Swedish political scientist and economist, expresses in his latest book ("The Challenge of World Poverty") his grave concern at "the prostitution of U.S. academic life" through the financing of re-

search on Latin American problems by the CIA and other government agencies. Latin America's intellectuals fully share Myrdal's evaluation.

Eisenhower's account of his second administration ("Waging Peace") also places the CIA in a role far more extensive than the collection and projection of facts. He provides data which can be collated with information from other sources to establish the leading part played by the CIA in organizing and equipping the force assembled in Central America in 1960 to invade Cuba.

A public official engaged in espionage might possibly defend the morality of deceiving an enemy. I do not see, however, any possible moral—or even political—justification for treating the American public as the enemy to be deceived. Yet such a practice seems to have become a recognized and widely accepted part of our institutions.

The CIA is not an insignificant detail of government. Its annual budget, for which the director does not have to account, is in excess of \$3 billion. The size of its staff is classified but it reportedly more than 20,000. Employees are exempt from civil service procedures. The agency makes and enforces its own rules for hiring, investigation and firing. And, as transpired in 1969 when it refused to allow its members to testify at a court-martial of Green Berets charged with murder, it is not even answerable to the nation's judicial system.

National security considerations may justify such exceptional procedures. But they must not be expanded to the point where they erode the bases of our system of law and justice.

STATINTL

Those Federal Sneaks

Harriet Van Horn

STATINTL

By instinct and tradition, Americans hate a sneak. Nobody is ever very surprised to learn that the words "sneak" and "snake" have descended to us from a single old Teutonic root "Sniken" — meaning to crawl or creep.

Given our instinct — plus what's left of our traditions — the sweetest news this chilly spring is the sudden visibility of the whole creepy, crawly, shifty, shabby, underhanded apparatus of official U. S. sneakery.

"They sent forth spies, which should feign themselves just men," says the Bible. And our government has followed suit, especially in the feigning of just — or even rational — motives. There appears to be not only an FBI agent behind every mailbox but a frantically busy "Red squad" in every village and town.

The good folk whose bumper stickers implore you to "Support Your Local Police" are now finding the police supporting them. Local constabularies are now receiving special funds to recruit and pay secret informers.

But soon the informer may be running for cover. According to Frank Donner's splendid piece on surveillance in a recent New York Review of Books, the indignant citizens who pilfered the files of the FBI office in Media, Pa., will soon be relasing the names of FBI informers. That agent lurking behind your mailbox may shortly be lurking behind a palm tree in some banana republic, and glad of the job. Sneaks, when exposed, are rarely praised by neighbors for their gallant actions.

Incredible as it seems, no less than 20 federal agencies are now engaged in spying on all of us, including, one supposes, whole legions of spies who don't know they're being spied on. It could all be dismissed as a rollicking game — were it not so sinister.

The agencies now stuffing their data banks with tiresome facts about you and me include: the FBI, the Army, the CIA, the Secret Service, Internal Revenue, the Intelligence Division of the Post Office, the Civil Service and the Department of Justice. In nine cases out of 10, such sur-

but it goes on and will continue to go on until irate citizens demand that it be topped.

Considering the paranoia, not to say sheer lunacy, that prevails in this spy network, you would have to be blind and dumb and living in a hollow tree to escape being watched by a creature the FBI calls an "Informant" and decent people still call a sneak.

If you've led a busy, useful life and you've not made it to the Agitator Index, the Suspected Subversive File or the Persons of Interest List, well, you must be doing something wrong. And you are clearly remiss in one of your prime duties as a citizen, which is to give J. Edgar Hoover's agents something to do.

It isn't necessary to be a Black Panther or a peace marcher to be classed as "suspicious" by the FBI. "Political intelligence indiscriminately sweeps into its net the mild dissenters along with those drawn to violence," Donner tells us. "Thus peaceful, moderate, lawful organizations — from the NAACP to the Fellowship of Reconciliation — become intelligence targets on the theory that they are linked to communism or subversion."

Equating dissent with subversion has always been the custom of the radical right, and of all mindless reactionaries. To deny the right to dissent is to deny the need for social change. And that, of course, is what too many government agencies are as their highest duty.

One of the more distasteful aspects of the FBI's surveillance program is its corruption — no other word will do — of young students. Bureau agents now are authorized to recruit informers from junior colleges, youngsters 18 and 19. These junior agents are classed as PSI (Potential Security Informant) or PRI (Potential Racial Informant).

Time was when I thought we were living in a PPS (Potential Police State). Now I know it's simply a PS, and has been for some time.

Horrible, as it is to realize how our society has decayed through the growing power of a domestic spy system, it is perhaps more chilling

ing to discover what the CIA is up to all around the world.

On television a few years ago, Sen. Wayne Morse blamed the "credibility chasm" in American opinion on the evil work of the CIA. On the Dick Cavett Show we heard Capt. Robert Marasco of the Green Berets tell in detail how he murdered a "triple agent" in Vietnam. He committed this murder, he said, because the CIA had ordered him to do so. "But why?" persisted Cavett and guest Brian Bodord. "Because he was my agent," came the answer.

Capt. Marasco also charged in the course of this appalling interview, that the CIA had arranged the auto accident that very nearly killed him last year. Why? Well, maybe because he was no longer their agent. And he knew too much. Could there be any more terrifying commentary on the state of the union in this year 1971?

Congress, furthermore, should be able to direct the President to bring hostilities in a particular theater to an end either immediately or within the confines of a specified schedule. Why should the power to declare or to recognize war not connote the power to call for the end of a conflict? The President has no inherent power to direct that a conflict be continued until it is "won"—in the sense that American objectives are fulfilled.

Nor would the presence of a treaty obligation inhibit Congress in the exercise of its authority. Treaties along with statutes are the "law of the land", but a treaty may be abrogated by legislative enactment.¹⁹ The President may have the power to use military force to effectuate the obligations of an existing treaty, but his authority is clearly subject to legislative restriction.²⁰

COMMANDER'S AUTHORITY IS NOT ALWAYS EXCLUSIVE

No war, declared or otherwise, may be maintained without Congressional support. There must be provision for men and materiel. Congress may necessarily use its appropriation power in the control of military involvements and commitments. It may say that certain funds are to be used for urban renewal rather than for armament, and the President must comply with the instruction. It may forbid the use of an appropriation for a particular item of materiel, and the President could not violate the instruction even though he thought it unwise. It follows that Congress may say in so many words that its appropriations are not to be used for operations in specified nations or for operations in a particular theater beyond a designated date.

The decision to make and to sustain declared or undeclared wars is one properly referable to the popular will and to the legislature as the agent of the popular will. The President may direct operations as commander in chief, and Congress may not ordain or establish a rival. The commander's authority, however, does not connote exclusive power to determine the extent and duration of operations.

A conclusion that this authority is lodged in the President free from legislative control is inconsistent with the nature of popular government, and a power so maintained in the face of Congressional inhibition could be challenged as illegitimate.

FOOTNOTES

¹ See, e.g., 50 App. U.S.C. § 462(b), prescribing a sentence of up to five years for burning or mutilating draft cards.

² This resolution, adopted August 7, 1964, because of information about attacks against attacks on American warships in the Gulf of Tonkin, gave the President the authority "to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression".

³ The ultimate form of this proposal is embodied in the Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 and reads as follows: "[Federal funds are not to be used] to finance the introduction of United States ground combat troops into Cambodia, or to provide United States advisors to or for Cambodian military forces in Cambodia."

⁴ The purpose of this proposal, which assumed several forms in the 91st Congress, was to set a date for the termination of the involvement of American forces in Vietnam.

⁵ *McCulloch v. Maryland*, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819).

⁶ The *Federalist* No. 69 (Hamilton) states that the Presidential power is less substantial than the power of the British Crown because it does not include the power to "declare war" or to "raise armies". The *Federalist* No. 71 (Hamilton) emphasizes the need for unitary command of operations, as justification for the power.

⁷ See Corwin, *The President: Office and Powers* 209-211 (4th ed. 1957).

⁸ See 1 MORRISON AND COMMAGER, *THE*

GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 373-374, 382-389 (3d ed., New York, Oxford, 1942).

⁹ HEARING, A HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA, 420-432 (1931), 429-432 (Haiti), 431-436 (Nicaragua), 473-473 (Panama).

¹⁰ See *The Constitution of the United States of America, Revised and Annotated*, 510-512 (G.P.O., 1933).

¹¹ Corwin, *op. cit.* note 7, at 200-201. Congress declared that "by the act of the Republic of Mexico, a state of war exists between that Government and the United States". Morrison and Commager, *op. cit.* Note 8, at 592.

¹² In the *Prize Cases*, 2 Black 635 (1863), the Court recognized a right of "prize and capture" appropriate under the laws of war, saying: "As a civil war is never publicly proclaimed, *eo nomine*, against insurgents, its actual existence is a fact in our domestic history which the court is bound to notice and to know. . . ." In *Texas v. White*, 7 Wall. 700 (1839), the Court held that Texas had never truly left the Union, and that the acts of its legislature in attempting secession were "absolutely null".

¹³ See 2 WARREN, *THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY* 425-437 (1929). *Case of Jefferson Davis*, 7 Fed. Cas. 63 (No. 3611d.). Davis was never brought to trial on the charges against him.

¹⁴ Corwin, *op. cit.* note 7, at 233-234.

¹⁵ There is merit in Mr. Deutsch's suggestion that a declaration of war may be omitted because Congress does not want to indicate total commitment. As to North Korea and North Vietnam, moreover, there are theoretical problems because the United States does not recognize the existence of either as a separate nation.

¹⁶ Corwin, *op. cit.*, note 7, at 171, 184-193, 201-204.

¹⁷ *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v. Sawyer*, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). The Court gave substantial attention to the failure of Congress to include seizure authority in the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, in spite of suggestions, and to the President's failure to make use of the methods provided in the act for avoiding strikes.

¹⁸ It has been suggested that the administration has made use of legalism and subterfuge in trying to assist the Cambodian government, while maintaining apparent compliance with the restrictions on American ground forces and advisers. See Dudman, *U.S. Deception in Cambodia*, St. Louis Post Dispatch, January 23, 1971, at 1-C. As to the use of American troops in Laos, see TRUE, February 22, 1971, page 24.

¹⁹ *The Constitution of the United States of America, Revised and Annotated* (G.P.O., 1933), at 470-473; *Whitney v. Robertson*, 124 U.S. 190 (1883).

²⁰ It is going too far to assert that the President is necessarily bound to use military force in support of another nation pursuant to a treaty obligation. Surely he has the authority to consider the situation as it is presented at the time decision is necessary. Might he not conclude that available forces are inadequate in view of other commitments, or that conditions had changed since the adoption of the treaty so that intervention would not be in the national interest, or that the use of force should be considered by Congress?

THE QUESTIONS OF MY LAI 4

HON. EDWIN B. FORSYTHE

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, April 23, 1971

Mr. FORSYTHE. Mr. Speaker, one of my constituents, Mr. Fred Jago, has given a great deal of thought—as have many

Americans—to the killings at My Lai and the sentencing of Lt. William Calley.

These tragic incidents have deepened the concern of many citizens of this Nation about the Indochina war and our role in it. Brought vividly to the attention of all Americans, they have shown the bloody waste that this war has brought.

Mr. Jago has written a well-documented statement concerning the Calley incident and the ravages of war. His statement follows:

THE QUESTIONS OF MY LAI 4

On 29 March 1971, a military court-martial found Lieutenant William L. Calley, Jr. guilty of the premeditated murder of 22 Vietnamese civilians on 16 March 1969 in an attack on the hamlet of My Lai 4. The verdict brings disgrace to the young officer and shame to our nation, our government, our army and our people. But more than that, the Calley trial has raised painful questions regarding the true and final responsibility for crimes of war.

As individual citizens or as a nation, we cannot condone what occurred at My Lai. But neither can we, in good conscience, permit just six superior officers to judge this as an isolated incident, the guilt and responsibility for which rests solely with Lieutenant Calley, when in fact the complete details and ultimate responsibility may never be justly determined.

War is the most repugnant act that mankind can inflict upon itself. It has spawned brutality and atrocities since the beginning of time, particularly with regard to innocent populations. Defenseless civilians have fallen prey to warring armies under the guise of reprisal for "aiding and abetting the enemy" or as object lessons for those who might be contemplating such aid. During the history of this great nation, our people and our government have contributed to or participated in many acts far more brutal than those for which Lieutenant Calley stands convicted.

Wholesale slaughter, for example, is no stranger to America. In 1637, while this country was still in its colonial childhood, Governor Vance sent orders from Boston that the Pequot Indians were to be exterminated. Captain John Mason, in obedience to these orders, attacked the Pequot fort at what is now Groton, Connecticut and annihilated over 1,000 men, women and children. Captain Mason was applauded for his efforts.

In July, 1675, it was customary for uniformed armies to face each other on a field of honor, fire back and forth, rank upon rank, until the defeated army retired. But a drastic change was in the making. The colonists were exposed to the tactics of the true guerilla. The Indian, much like the Viet Cong of our times, slipped in and out of the vast wilderness to attack when ever they felt they had the advantage, then melted away again. Colonists had been horrified by the brutality of these raids and a unit under Captain Samuel Mosely responded in kind. After a fierce engagement with the Wampanongs at Swansea, Massachusetts, a young lieutenant took the first Indian scalps of the war and sent the grisly trophies to Boston. Scalping and mutilation of the enemy soon became an accepted after-action occurrence.

After the defeat of Metacombet, son of the famed Massasoit, one Captain Benjamin Church ordered the chief beheaded and quartered. Metacombet's head was sent to Plymouth, where it was displayed on a gibbet for 20 years as a reminder to other tribes. A hand was sent to Boston, while the rest of the body was left to rot because the Plymouth authorities would not permit it to be buried. Far from being accused of any wrong doing, Captain Church was hailed as a military hero.

In 1779, the father of our country, George

GARDEN CITY, N.Y.

NEWSDAY APR 20 1971

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Your Agent

Government intelligence work can be an extremely dirty business requiring men to do much that is uncivilized in the name of civilization, usually their own. The U.S. has what may be the most formidable of these organizations, the renowned Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA's function is to protect the American way from outside influence and the public should not be deluded about the agency's dedication to this task.

Recently, a former Green Beret, Robert Marasco, admitted killing a Vietnamese man on the orders of the CIA. The man, supposedly, was a triple espionage agent. Marasco says he put two shots in the man's head after being told by the CIA to eliminate him "with extreme prejudice."

Only a few days later, Richard Helms, CIA director, in an unusual speech, asked the nation to "take it on faith that we too are honorable men" dedicated to democratic ideals. Undoubtedly, Helms was speaking sincerely. But there can be no honor in murder nor in the many other questionable activities attributed in the past to the CIA. Should Helms really think his people are representing this democracy honorably, the failure is more ours than his. If murder and assorted acts of intrigue are in fact, central to our survival, we should acknowledge what we have become and question our own commitment to the ideals Helms is sworn to protect.

The Honorable Men Of The CIA

Last week Richard Helms in his first public speech since his 1966 appointment as director of the Central Intelligence Agency tried to counter what he characterized as a "persistent and growing body of criticism which questions the need and the propriety for a democratic society to have a Central Intelligence Agency." He attributed the criticism to an "inherent American distaste for peacetime gathering of intelligence," and told his audience that the nation must "take it on faith that we too are honorable men devoted to her service."

If Mr. Helms's analysis of information gathered abroad is as incomplete and misleading as his interpretation of what prompts criticism of his agency here at home, then the country is clearly in trouble. It is not the intelligence gathering aspect of the CIA's operations that has fed the growing body of criticism. What the critics object to are covert paramilitary operations around the globe, and they question whether the secrecy that is admittedly required for some aspects of intelligence gathering should be extended to cover a host of questionable and frequently illegal activities under the pretext of serving an undefined "national interest."

In the years since it has become active in covert operations the CIA has financed the invasions of two countries, Cuba and Guatemala, and otherwise influenced the establishment and overthrow of governments in a number of lands, including Vietnam. It provided planes and mercenary pilots to the Congo (some of the same men it trained to invade Cuba) and for several years it has financed and directed a mercenary army in Laos in violation of our treaty commitments. At the same time it has engaged in activities that have more to do with propaganda than intelligence. It has subsidized magazines and publishing companies and the operation of radio

stations which free advertising in this country portrayed as supported by private donations.

In addition there have been instances in recent years when the agency has apparently been successful in establishing for itself a place above the law. Two examples are the dismissal of a slander suit against an agent on the ground that, even though his statements were not substantiated, he was acting under orders, and the case of the Green Berets accused by the Army of murdering a suspected Vietnamese double agent, but never brought to trial because the CIA refused to supply witnesses.

Even assuming that Mr. Helms is correct in his contention that the agency functions under the tight control of the President, an assumption which many knowledgeable critics dispute, the fact remains that the agency's activities have evaded the checks provided by the Constitution and in doing so it has deceived the American people. The issue, then, is not whether the men in charge of the CIA are devoted, or even honorable, and faith is not the answer to such fundamental criticism. It was faith in the efficacy of covert military and political manipulation, after all, that propelled us into our tragic involvement in Southeast Asia.

What is needed is a check on the presidential fascination with Mr. Helms's "Department of Dirty Tricks," a fascination that has pervaded the past four administrations. Congress is the appropriate body to provide that check, even though at present it is not doing so. The supervision now supplied by a handful of key members of Congress is, in the words of a recent Twentieth Century Fund study, "only sporadic and largely *ex post facto*." Fortunately there are efforts now underway to strengthen congressional oversight of the CIA. These efforts deserve the support of the American people.

No Business Like What Business?

By RUSSELL BAKER

OBSERVER

About midnight several days ago, a man appeared on the television screen in the cellar of our house to tell about a killing he had committed. Everybody else in the house had gone to bed. I mention this because the odd aspect of this whole business, looking back on it, was one watcher's personal reaction to this midnight of television and, in order to convey any sense at all of the peculiarity of the thing, I have to give you a glimpse of my personal situation.

Everybody else, then, was in bed. What is curious is that it never occurred to me to race upstairs and rouse anyone. Here was a man going on in great detail right there in our cellar about this killing he had performed, yet it seemed no more worth disturbing the house for than if it had another Phyllis Diller appearance.

It was the Dick Cavett show and it had begun, as usual, with Dick's monologue, and a promise of pleasant anesthesia as Dick read off the cast of show-biz people on hand to plug their various enterprises.

Brian Bedford came first. He is in a play in New York and seemed agreeable. Agreeability is a virtue at midnight in the cellar, at least in our house, and since there is too little of it, Brian was a welcome guest.

He and Dick kept smiling, even through one rocky passage about a suicide. One felt headache and reality slinking off in defeat; one sensed the settling of the facial muscles into a fixed, fatigued smile. That smile, the cat could have told you, was a smile seen only on the best midnights down in that cellar, a smile that said, "All is, for this brief moment, right with the world."

Brian and Dick paused while several brief films were run. Most of them argued that this or that spot on the body gave off unpleasant odors and showed expensive aerosol sprays which would make the offending flesh smell like a chemistry lab. It was ridiculous stuff but amusing in a dumb way.

Then Dick was back with his next guest. He introduced Capt. Bob Marasco. The audience applauded. Down in our cellar, the pleased smile may have shown a trace of frown. Captain Marasco? The name was vaguely familiar. Was it somebody who had just made a new Andy Warhol movie?

It was not. Dick said that Captain Marasco, who lived in Bloomfield, N.J., was a former Green Beret officer who had been charged by the Army some

time ago with murdering a Vietnamese man and then discharged from the service after the murder charge had been dropped.

A few days before his guest appearance with Dick, Bob had told The New York Times that he had, in fact, killed the Vietnamese in question, who he said was a triple espionage agent. Dick quickly filled in his audience on this background, and Bob, who had a lot of poise on camera, began to tell about the killing.

In the opening phase, I did not listen so much as I looked. That is the norm when you get a new personality on the talk shows. Bob appeared to be a tall, broad-shouldered, athletic young man. His clothing style was mod without being odd. "Carefully groomed" would be the cliché. A careful man, a methodical man. Perhaps even a finicky, fastidious man when it came to details. Very neat in his habits one would guess. A good worker.

Bob's account of the killing seemed to bear this out. He answered Dick's questions with details which a less fastidious man might have glossed over in his recitation. Yes, Bob said, Dick was right: two shots in the fellow's head. Of course, he had been pumped full of morphine before the shooting, which made it as humanitarian as you could possibly make something as awkward as killing a man, Bob volunteered.

Dick looked slightly aghast and held up a shampoo. Brief films were shown to sell consumer goods. This was not too dull, this talk with Bob. Would Dick cut it short to bring on Patsy Kelly, who was playing in "No, No, Nanette"?

Gosh, all the talk shows had somebody from "No, No, Nanette," but how many nights did anybody come up with a guest like Bob?

The show was back. Good! Dick was going to keep Bob talking. What do you do now for a living? he asked Bob. Bob smiled slightly, knowing he

was going to get a laugh, already indicating he would rather not. He said he sold life insurance. The audience laughed. Brian, who was still there, looked white and wilted, although this may just have been a faulty video tube.

Dick asked about putting the body in a mail sack and weighting it with tire irons and dumping it from a rowboat into several hundred feet of water in the China Sea, and he asked why Bob thought the body had not been found. Bob smiled the smile of a man who knew something unpleasant and said the waters were "shark-infested."

Brian asked how Bob could possibly have done it. Bob said he had what amounted to an official execution order from the C.I.A. An order to "eliminate with extreme prejudice." Everybody who worked with the C.I.A. knew what that meant, Bob said. He had done it to serve his country, to serve us in the audience, to serve me down there in my cellar. He was not telling it now for profit, was not making any money, in fact, from his story. He just wanted us to know what duty we were all exacting from our Army.

There was a station break. A brief film showed a liquid that did a terrific job of cleaning a toilet. By 1 A.M. Bob had begun to yawn and when Dick went off I dozed with a yawn in search of an old movie. Later, going up to bed, there was a moment on the steps when the numbness lifted momentarily, and I marveled, for just an instant, that the TV set never turned into a cobra and bit us.

STATINTL

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By BENJAMIN WELLES

WASHINGTON.

CAN tell when he walks in the door what sort of a day it's been," says his wife, Cynthia. "Some days he has on what I call his 'Oriental look'—totally inscrutable. I know better than to ask what's happened. He'll talk when he's ready, not before, but even when he talks he's terribly discreet."

The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Richard Helms, apparently brings his problems home from the office like any other husband—at least to hear Cynthia Helms tell it. And these days Helms's job is definitely one of the most problem-ridden in Washington.

Successive budget cuts, balance of payments restrictions, bureaucratic rivalries and press disclosures that have hurt the C.I.A.'s public image have all reduced its operations considerably. President Nixon has recently ordered a fiscal and management investigation into the intelligence "community," a task which may take longer and prove more difficult than even Nixon suspects because of the capacity of the intelligence agencies to hide in the bureaucratic thickets. Both Nixon and his principal foreign affairs adviser,

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Henry Kissinger, are said to regard the community as a mixed blessing: intrinsically important to the United States but far too big and too prone to obscure differences of opinion—or, sometimes, no opinion—behind a screen of words.

Considered a cold-blooded necessity in the Cold War days, the agency now seems to many students, liberal intellectuals and Congressmen, to be undemocratic, conspiratorial, sinister. The revelations in recent years that have made the agency suspect include its activities in Southeast Asia, the Congo, Guatemala, the Bay of Pigs; the U-2 flights; its secret funding through "front" foundations of the National Student Association plus private cultural, women's and lawyers' groups; and, finally, two years ago, the Green Berets affair.

The 53-year-old Helms knows all this, better than most. As the first career intelligence officer to reach the

top since the C.I.A. was created in 1947, his goal has been to professionalize the agency and restore it to respectability. In fact, one of his chief preoccupations has been to erase the image of the Director as a man who moves in lavish mystery, jetting secretly around the world to make policy with prime ministers, generals and kings, and brushing aside, on the pretext of "security," the public's vague fears and Congress's probing questions. If Helms rules an "invisible empire," as the C.I.A. has sometimes been called, he is a very visible emperor.

While he tries to keep his lunches free for work, for example, he occasionally shows up at a restaurant with a friend for lunch: a light beer, a cold plate, one eye always on the clock. He professes the Occidental, a tourist-frequented restaurant near the White House where, if he happens to be seen, there is likely to be less gossip than if he were observed entering a private home.

He likes the company of attractive women—young or old—and they find him a charming dinner partner and a good dancer.

"He's interesting—and interested in what you're saying," said Lydia Katzenbach, wife of the former Democratic Attorney General. "He's well-read and he doesn't try to substitute flirting for conversation, that old Princeton '43 routine that some of the columnists around town use."

Some of his critics complain that he is too close to the press—even though most agree that he uses it, with rare finesse, for his own and his agency's ends. Some dislike the frequent mention of Helms and his handsome wife in the gossip columns and society pages of the nation's capital.

Yet, if he gives the appearance of incoherence—he is witty, gregarious, friendly—the reserve is there, like a high-voltage electric barrier, just beneath the surface. Helms is a mass of apparent contradictions: inwardly self-disciplined and outwardly relaxed, absorbed in the essential yet fascinated by the trivial. A former foreign correspondent, he observes much and can tell you in a way that few can—husbands, ever note in the first place—what gown each woman wore to a dinner and whose shoulder strap

PORTLAND, ME.
EXPRESS

E - 29,992

APR 17 1971

Keep The Green Berets

Most of the Special Forces, or Green Berets, as they are often romantically called, are home from Vietnam and now the big question is what their future will be.

One thing is certain, their peak strength of 9,000 will be cut to 6,000, and this leads some military men to think the force will gradually be phased out.

This would be a great mistake, because we may never see another conventional war, even in Western Europe, since tactical nuclear weapons no longer render it feasible to fight battles with masses of men.

The Green Berets encountered some difficulties in Vietnam linked to what they call their "department of dirty tricks", employing techniques also known to the CIA. But the Berets are a superbly trained force highly competent in the kind of war being fought in Indo-China, and by far it is the most popular branch of the armed

forces. Fort Bragg trains about 10,000 men a year in the Green Berets' special skills, including several hundred "students" from Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America. Fort Bragg also sends military assistance training teams to foreign countries to teach counter-insurgency, coupled with lessons in winning over the populace in backward areas, through improved farming, education and sanitation.

Army "regulars" look with dislike upon the Special Forces because of their elite status, but it was the army regulars who failed in Vietnam with their conventional tactics unsuited to that country, while the Green Berets succeeded. If the Pentagon and the White House are wise they will retain the Special Forces, provide larger numbers of infantrymen with their training, and keep them in readiness for future conflicts on the Indo-Chinese pattern.

WASHINGTON STAR

16 APR 1971

POINT OF VIEW

Trial of Army About to Start

By MARY McGRORY

Star Staff Writer

Col. Oran K. Henderson has been charged by the Army with failure to investigate vigorously what the specifications delicately call "reports of excessive killing of noncombatants" at My Lai.

If Henderson's chief counsel, Henry Rothblatt, has his way, however, it will be the man who a year later did investigate the massacre for the Army — Lt. Gen. William R. Peers — who actually will be on trial.

The tactic of trying someone other than the defendant failed miserably at the court-martial of Lt. William Calley, but his chief defense counsel, George W. Latimer, was old and tired, and Rothblatt is neither.

Rothblatt is obviously going to conduct a search-and-destroy mission against the top brass in the Pentagon. Early in the morning as the pretrial hearing resumed, he was saying that, "We in effect charge Gen. Peers with making false statements."

Westmoreland Scored

At the morning break, he held a press conference in the courtroom, and opened fire on Gen. William W. Westmoreland. If Col. Henderson had been derelict in his duty to report what went on at My Lai, then Gen. Westmoreland may have been "equally guilty of dereliction," said the aggressive attorney.

Rothblatt is a New Yorker, 54 years old. He has darting brown eyes, a long tongue, a pencil-thin mustache and a suspiciously luxuriant crop of wavy brown hair. He is obviously of the school that believes a trial is total warfare, and the Pentagon can expect heavy artillery, sniping, and no end of harassment-and-interdiction fire.

Rothblatt understands that a lawyer who cannot always offer good law can at least provide good theater.

No one seemed more entertained by Rothblatt's lively, anti-flinging interventions

than the judge, Col. Peter S. Wondolowski, a man of heroic geniality, who sips coffee from a large brown mug shaped rather like himself.

Judge Beams On Him

After Rothblatt had pronounced himself "shocked — a condition hard to credit to an attorney of his cynicism and experience — at some Army failing, and had heaped scorn on the earnest young prosecutor, the judge beamed on him.

"Thank you, Mr. Rothblatt," he said, as one might compliment a particularly good turn from a soloist.

The pair have met before. Wondolowski had presided at the trial of James Duffy, a young lieutenant charged in the murder of a South Vietnamese soldier. At his afternoon press conference in the courtroom, Rothblatt said he had tried to indict Army policy in Vietnam in that case and had failed. The judge had thrown out his defense, and, Rothblatt said, "I learned my lesson from that one."

Temporary Insanity

With his next defendant, John LaNasa, who was accused in the same case, Rothblatt pleaded temporary insanity, due to "brain washing"—the "body count," and all. LaNasa was acquitted.

But Rothblatt's most critical education came with the Green Beret case, where he served with the high-powered team of Edward Bennett Williams and F. Lee Bailey. One of the men charged, Capt. Robert Marasco, told the Dick Cavett show audience last week that indeed a South Vietnamese suspected of being a double agent—or maybe triple—had been summarily executed.

But Rothblatt and the others put the heat on the Army by threatening to put the CIA and its practices in the dock, and the charges were dropped.

Sensitivity Known

Rothblatt knows that the Army is sensitive about its se-

crets. He will demand every witness and every piece of paper that might reveal that Henderson, in his languid investigation of what Ronald Ridenhour called "something rather dark and bloody" at My Lai, was following a policy of suppressing events of potential embarrassment to the Army.

Rothblatt said that he thought the uproar over the Calley verdict had created a favorable atmosphere for his client, who, like Calley, he thinks, was "just basically doing his job—perhaps a little clumsily."

Rothblatt, who works the title of the new novel he wrote with Robin Moore, "Court-Martial", into most of his conversations, thinks that soldiers should be disciplined, quietly, within the Army.

'Dignified Conclusion'

"That's a nice dignified conclusion," he said. "That's what the American public prefers. These trials don't do our national and international image any good."

So the trial on the Army, which never occurred at the Calley court-martial, is about to begin. Rothblatt is, the prosecutor admitted, "very resourceful." It takes a certainchutzpah to charge Gen. Peers were being "overzealous" in making an investigation which the defendant should have made.

But Rothblatt has learned from the Army that the best defense is an offense, and he is going to make himself as offensive as possible to Henderson's superiors.

But Rothblatt has learned from the Army that the best defense is an offense, and he is going to make himself as offensive as possible to Henderson's superiors.



NOT CONSIDERED

Bob Marasco, Green Beret

STATINTL

The Calley case has caused enormous controversy in this land and overseas. And within families, too. Frank Marasco, who is a partner in an insurance agency in Bloomfield, N.J., fired his son Bob the other day. Mrs. Marasco agreed that this was the only thing to do with their pride and joy, who was being groomed to take over the old man's end of the business. Seems he came out for Calley, whom he doesn't know, but in a most extraordinary way.

Bob Marasco, a reserve captain who served in Vietnam with the Green Berets (who, incidentally, never call themselves Green Berets) was emotionally moved by reading a new Doubleday book titled "Court Martial," a fictionalized account of the murder of a double-agent in Vietnam by Green Berets a couple of years ago. It was written by Robin Moore, who wrote the first book about the Berets, and attorney Henry Rothblatt, who has defended a number of accused servicemen in this war.

What bugged Marasco, he told us the other day, was that the authors of "Court Martial" printed classified details about his participation in the murder of the double agent that he himself had not been able to use in his own defense. He and half a dozen others were held for six weeks in solitary at Long Binh jail, then mysteriously released before their trials could start.

MARASCO CALLED MOORE after reading the book and in the course of their conversation stated that his case resembled Calley's — but he went free and Calley got life. He wanted to do something about that, even at risk of being recalled into the Army and put on trial. Moore suggested that he tell his story of The New York Times.

The Times isn't accustomed to readers calling in to confess killings. A rewrite man took what Marasco called "half the story." It must have interested somebody along the chain of command at The Times.

"They sent a young fellow over to interview me, a long-haired fellow," Marasco related. The young fellow soon had himself quite a story:

MARASCO TOLD HIM about the last days of Thai Khac Chuyen, a \$250 a month agent so trusted by the Berets and the CIA that they put him in charge of other native spies on the payroll. One of these turned in Thai Khac Chuyen, and, as

evidence, produced a picture of the man with his arm around a Vietcong general.

Confronted with the picture, the agent swore that he was faithful to the American side. He was forced to undergo a lie-detector test and also questioned while under the influence of a "truth serum."

The Berets urged the CIA to send the agent away for a year, during which time he would lose his enemy contacts. According to Marasco the CIA said it had no capability of doing that. "Elimination is the best course of action," Marasco says the CIA ruled. So the man was knocked out by morphine, shot through the head twice, admittedly by Marasco, and buried at sea in a weighted mail sack.

WHEN THE TIMES front-paged the story, Marasco's parents were shocked. The father shut the door between their offices, and fired him. The reserve officer's wife, who knew the story, stood by him. "I love him," she told the parents.

"I don't know how I'm going to pay the rent," Marasco said with a mirthless laugh over a drink at "21" the other day. "But I'm content that I did the right thing. If Calley is to go to jail, so should a lot of others. Anybody who ever took part in an atrocity in this war should now step forward."

(He subsequently told Ed Newman on the TODAY show that he felt Calley symbolized every young draftee who is taught to kill in training camp, then sent to a strange land where he hears lurid stories about being surrounded by enemies, sees friends killed, becomes a nest of neuroses, is told that only "body count" counts, is ordered to attack a suspected village, and "sadly overreacts." He added, to Newman, "But murder? No!")

Marasco is critical of the conduct of the war in which he served and was honorably discharged.

"War is what Sherman said it was," he said. "But this one has a worse side to it, if possible. It's a war we have no intention of trying to win. We fight it defensively, not offensively. Under those terms it could last another ten years. If that's what we can expect in the future, we shouldn't fight any kind of war. Do the New York Knicks play for a tie? Of course they don't; they play to win."

He hasn't heard from his father.
Or the Army.

LITTLE ROCK GAZETTE
 Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001100100001-1

APR 1 2 1977

M - 108,821

S - 124,741

Nixon's 'Beret' Sub

Although we were constantly underestimating him in such matters, not even Lyndon Johnson, we think, would have sent a Green Beret to throw out the first ball at the Senators' opener just two days after the public admission by a former member of this "elitist" corps that the Berets served as political assassins in Vietnam, "hit" men for the "finger" men of the CIA. Richard Nixon brought it off with no more qualms or queasiness than it would take for some of us to get down our Mothersill's.

The ex-Beret — Robert Marasco — had held his peace while he was still subject to court-martial and for some time after setting up shop as a life insurance salesman in New Jersey, but says that he was moved to speak out now because of the life sentence assessed against Lieutenant William L. Calley Jr., for his role in the massacre at My Lai.

As for Marasco himself, he says there was nothing he did in Vietnam, including political executions, that he did not undertake out of the highest "patriotic" motives — like Calley. "I never wake up in the night screaming."

It is only when we read the full news service account of a personal testimony that is more boast than confession that we are enabled to discover that the South Vietnamese political figure who was "terminated with extreme prejudice" was not just the "double agent" that he supposedly was liquidated for being, but a "triple agent" working in the interests of General Duong Van (Big)

Minh, the political rival of General Thieu, whose name keeps popping up as the possible instrument of a future coalition government in South Vietnam.

Marasco's revelations thus relate not only to his fellow Beret's subbing for Nixon at the Senators' game, but, more seriously, to a stern statement by Majority Leader Mike Mansfield of Montana issued the same day in the name of the Democratic leadership, calling upon the Nixon administration not to interfere in the fall elections in South Vietnam on the side of the Thieu-Ky government. The Mansfield warning was made in connection with a resolution by Senator Adlai E. Stevenson III of Illinois accusing the administration of having already done just that, and demanding that it cease and desist in future.

At the very least, let's have our military people out there refrain from killing off agents and supporters of such oppositionist political figure as are still left in that "Free World" bastion.



Jack Keefe Says

Many Brave Americans Have Died in Vietnam

STATINTL

Warrant Officer Bill Lassiter III was a Miami boy. He graduated from Southwest High, attended Miami-Dade Junior College. His wife, the former Beverly Davis, and their little daughter live in Arcola, Ill. Bill was one of the majority of American combat men in Vietnam who fought as good soldiers should in the bloody tragedy of war.

Last May in Cambodia, Lassiter, a helicopter pilot, received an urgent call for help from an encircled unit. He made rocket runs in the face of machine gun and small arms fire, but saw the rockets exploding against trees. Bill then made his runs lower and slower to insure of hitting bunkers. The North Viets shot him down. For that Lassiter was posthumously awarded the Silver Star, and when his tiny daughter grows up she'll see it with his Distinguished Flying Cross, Bronze Star and other awards. Bill was a credit to his country and the service. He fought an armed enemy, matching his life against theirs, while the monstrous acts of others must be recorded in the thin hope there'll never be a repetition, let's remember gallant ones like Bill Lassiter III.

★ ★ ★

THEY called Ilse Koch "the blond beast of Belsen." Everyone experienced a sense of horror when they read of her beatings and tortures of prisoners in the Nazi death camp. That horror was climaxed when it was proved that Ilse had murdered Jews with tattoos, flayed them and had the skin made into lamp shades.

Recent statements by several returned GIs are more

"All gooks (meaning Vietnamese) are fair game. Why not? The company with the highest body count got free beer, so we killed everybody. I've known guys to dig out a dead gook's teeth with a bayonates, bore holes in them, and string the teeth around their necks."

You just can't bring yourself to believe that a young American would act like Ilse Koch. . . . It also seemed unbelievable that Lt. William Calley could throw a two-year-old baby into a ditch, and gun it to death along with screaming adults, but evidence proved he did.

★ ★ ★

HOW could you bring yourself to believe that American soldiers, bitter at their officers, could throw grenades onto cots of sleeping men and blow them to bits? In his last speech President Nixon said the majority of American soldiers in Vietnam were brave men . . . brave in battle, and helpful and kind with women and children. This is true beyond doubt, but the number of sadistic killer types and hard drug addicts is frightening beyond words.

All our soldiers in Vietnam can't be lumped together as gallant defenders of liberty and the honor of our land. Let's not accept a belief that war crimes are excusable if committed by Americans, or that murder in war and civilian life is so common we can shake it off, like rain off an oilskin.

It seems to be coming to that. People who couldn't stand seeing a dangerous dog shot to death suggest that Lt. Calley should be given a medal for what he did at My Lai. Former Green Beret Capt. Robert Marasco admitted that, in cold blood, he shot to death an unarmed,

unresisting Vietnamese triple agent. A representative of the CIA is said to have suggested that the easiest way out of a dilemma was to murder the spy, so Marasco pulled the trigger. He and several other Green Beret officers were slated for courts-martial but the CIA refused to testify and the charges were dropped. Now Capt. Marasco is a candidate for a seat in the New Jersey Assembly, and some political leaders have endorsed him as "ideal." Apparently, murder isn't murder any more.

★ ★ ★

BUT, WHILE we should not forget deeds that have muddled our flag, we must remember and praise the daring ones, like Bill Lassiter. The U.S. Command gave medals to his family, and names his squadron's helicopter pad after him, but the young man is gone, and only a warm memory of him remains . . . one of 50,000 memories in an inexcusable war. None of the offered reasons or excuses hold water. The war should have been fought by Asian boys, or Lyndon Baines Johnson, as he sent more and more American ones into the fire of Vietnam. Let's hope the world eventually forgets what we did there.



Lieutenant Calley leaves court under guard: A symbol for all that was wrong with the war

Judgment at Fort Benning

He had been more than four months on trial and nearly two weeks awaiting judgment, and now First Lt. William Calley stood at last before the six officers of the jury, looking child-size and hot-faced and entirely too ordinary to be anybody's symbol of anything. He managed a slow, ragged salute, then gulped for air and trembled while the jury president read from a sheaf of white legal paper: "Lieutenant Calley, it is my duty ... to inform you that the court ... finds you ... guilty of premeditated murder ..." Calley's jaw went slack. His eyes fluttered. He stood rigidly through the rest of it, then forced another salute and sat down. The judgment of his brother Army officers was in: Calley had murdered at least 22 Vietnamese civilians at the hamlet called My Lai 4 just over three years ago. And so he became a symbol indeed: an outlaw soldier whose case embodied everything that was wrong with the war—and whose conviction fed the mounting pressures on President Nixon to speed it to an end.

Calley was a folk hero to some, a fall guy to others; it scarcely mattered which. The verdict, and the life sentence returned two days later, were massively unpopular, and their unpopularity made the judgment on Calley a first-magnitude political event. Many argued that Calley was a scapegoat for war crimes at far higher levels of military and civilian

authority (page 30); hawks even more clamorously argued that he was a martyr thrown to the wolves—or, rather, the doves. And both sides joined the public outcry. At the White House, clerks busily logged in an estimated 100,000 telegrams, 100 to 1 pro-Calley. Flags flapped at half-staff—spontaneously in many areas, by order of the governor in Indiana. Free-Calley resolutions dropped into hopper in at least nine state legislatures. Draft boards quit en masse in communities scattered from Georgia to Connecticut to New Mexico. Local groups circulated pro-Calley petitions, held pro-Calley rallies, staged pro-Calley marches. Anti-war Viet vets showed their solidarity by trying to get themselves arrested. A Houston gun dealer put out a huge sign that said, FREE CALLEY OR TRY TRUMAN.

Rap: What happened in the streets was only the visible manifestation of a deep feeling that Calley got a raw deal—a psychic reaction to be placed alongside the 1968 Tet offensive and the 1970 Cambodia incursion among the traumata of an unhappy war. In a NEWSWEEK poll conducted by The Gallup Organization (page 28), Americans disapproved the verdict and the sentence by about 8 to 1. Only a relative few doubted that what happened at My Lai was a crime. The far more general view was that such incidents were common—and the over-

whelming conviction was that Calley was taking the rap for his superiors.

Congress got the message; the Calley verdict, following close behind the pell-mell allied retreat from Laos, seemed to crystallize a growing bipartisan disgust with the war—and to energize efforts to force Mr. Nixon to close it down by some "time certain" deadline no later than January 1973. The President thus far has successfully resisted any such impulse. But Laos and now Calley forced him to move fast to defuse an increasingly volatile situation.

He took the unprecedented step of ordering Calley released from the Fort Benning stockade and returned to his quarters pending appeal; the move almost surely made it harder for Army reviewing authorities to sustain Calley's conviction—but it got a solid hand in the House and, as the NEWSWEEK poll indicated, an enormous vote of approval from the nation. Two days later, he moved again to damp the continuing uproar—this time dispatching staff topsider John Ehrlichman to meet the press at an on-camera briefing and announce that the President himself would personally review the case before any sentence is carried out.

And, with both Laos and the Calley case turning up the heat, Mr. Nixon rescheduled his next troop-withdrawal announcement for this week—a week earlier than he had planned. Top aides

STATINTL

BOISE, IDAHO
STATESMAN

APR 9 1971
D - 51,447
S - 56,087

A CIA-Directed Killing Acknowledged

One of the mysteries of the Vietnam war has been solved, at least unofficially. The story adds further evidence about the nature of the war.

It ought to be told because the people have a right to know about it. In this case the telling came because of the efforts of a reporter, and not official sources.

The New York Times reporter questioned Robert F. Marasco, one of eight Green Berets who were charged in the killing of a South Vietnamese. Charges were eventually dropped. It was rumored that the man was killed because he was a "double agent" working for the Viet Cong.

✓ Marasco said that he killed the man, acting on orders from the Central Intelligence Agency. He was drugged with morphine, placed in a motorboat, shot and dumped into the South China Sea.

Thai Khac Chuyen was described as an intelligence agent, whose job was to train and direct sub-agents. He was killed after

a photo was found showing him talking to a North Vietnamese official. But Marasco said he was actually a triple agent with allegiance to a group led by the South Vietnamese Gen. Duong Van Minh which sought a coalition government.

The Times reporter was also told that hundreds were executed by South Vietnamese agents trained and financed by the CIA, and some also by American advisers. ✓

So his story confirms rumors that the CIA sponsored the killing of Vietnamese suspected of working for the enemy. The Viet Cong and North Vietnamese have, of course, employed similar tactics. They don't seem to be uncommon in this kind of guerrilla war.

This kind of killing is not the same as the slaying of old men, women and children at My Lai. But there are some parallels. The usual rules of war were not observed.

SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.
EXAMINER
E - 204,749
EXAMINER & CHRONICLE
S - 640,004

STATINTL

APR 8 1971

Pentagon Gives Up On Viet War Crime Trials

Examiner News Services

WASHINGTON — The Pentagon said today it had given up trying to find ways to try former servicemen for atrocities committed in Vietnam.

Spokesman Jerry Friedheim said discussions by the Pentagon and the Justice Department had ended, unable to resolve the problem of jurisdiction.

Friedheim said attorneys for both the Army and the Justice Department gave the problem exhaustive study — but “at the moment nobody’s trying any more.”

This apparently means that Paul Meadlo and other GIs at My Lai will not be prosecuted. Meadlo testified at the Calley trial that he helped shoot men, women and children.

During the early stages of the Army’s probe, at least 31 soldiers or former soldiers were under investigation for My Lai.

Later, the Pentagon said that 15 men were being actively investigated but left the service before charges could be brought against them.

Friedheim, however, left open a remote possibility that perhaps some way could be found to bring charges against such men.

“I’m not saying nothing will ever happen,” he said, adding “The problem is not being actively pursued because nobody has found a way to do it. It has turned

out to be, as a practical matter, an insoluble problem at this time.”

The question arose earlier in the week after Robert Marasco, a former Green Beret captain, admitted killing a Vietnamese double agent at the suggestion of the CIA. He was charged along with seven other Green Berets. The charges were dropped, however, because the CIA refused to present witnesses. Marasco was later discharged.

Friedheim said he did not know how many other men, like Marasco, had been discharged from the service and later either admitted atrocities or were found to be involved in atrocities.

He said the Pentagon and the Justice Department had been working for 18 months in an effort to find some way of bringing these men to trial, as is required under the Geneva Conventions.

The Supreme Court 15 years ago ruled out military courtmartial for former servicemen in invalidating one section of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

8 APR 1971

*Former Beret,
Killer of Agent,
Turns to Politics*

NEWARK, N.J., April 7 (UPI) — Robert F. Marasco, the former Green Beret captain who admitted killing a Vietnamese double agent, emerged yesterday as a potential candidate for the state assembly.

Marasco, 29, made a 10-minute appearance before the Essex County Republican screening committee Tuesday night. He was rated "impressive" by county chairman George M. Wallhauser Jr.

Marasco and seven other Green Berets were charged with the June 20, 1969, murder of agent Thai Khac Chuyen. They never came to trial because the CIA would not present witnesses.

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NEWARK, N.J.

NEWS

APR 5 1971

E - 267,289

S - 423,331

Marasco Pleads: 'Speak Out'

By RICHARD BILOTTI

Evening News Staff Writer

Robert F. Marasco, a former Green Beret captain who publicly admitted Friday that he had killed a Vietnamese double agent on orders from the Central Intelligence Agency, criticized the entire moral attitude of the United States in a speech yesterday to the Men's Club of Montclair's Temple Shomrei Emunah.

"Our country was founded on truth and freedom and it seems to be eroding," said Marasco, who was charged 18 months ago with the killing and for conspiracy with seven other Green Beret officers. The Army subsequently dropped the charges, reportedly because of the CIA involvement.

Defines Problem

"I have lived a half-truth for the past 13 months. I now have a more comfortable feeling and maybe that is one of the problems with our country," Marasco said.

"I made the decision to speak out the last few days because of circumstances surrounding the conviction of Lt. (William L.) Calley."

"We have not been told the whole truth, only because we don't want to be told the truth. Those of you who lived through World War II and Korea and saw the so-called atrocities of those wars are as guilty as Lt. Calley."

"The people back home call certain actions atrocities; I call them war. If you don't want to have those things happen, don't have war. War is immoral. How can you fight a moral war? It is impossible."

Appeal to Young

Marasco, who spoke extemporaneously, appealed to the younger persons in the audience to help prevent the United States from becoming involved in other such

"The older generation has done nothing, my generation has done nothing. Maybe the youngsters can do something to help us," said Marasco, a 29-year-old life insurance salesman in Bloomfield.

He stressed repeatedly his belief that Americans as a nation are "hypocrites" and "we must start telling the truth."

"Many people are down on the kids because they have long hair and dress funny, and because they are anti-establishment. Well, at least they are truthful about themselves," Marasco said.

Drugs to Martinis

"What is so good about our establishment? We complain because they use drugs, but we have to have our martinis. We are hypocrites and we've got to stop it," he said.

Marasco said he did not like being thought of as hero in the same terms as Audie Murphy, the famed World War II hero. He thought of himself only as having done what he should do for his country and every soldier in Vietnam is doing the same, he added.

Marasco offered no solutions to the Vietnam war but stressed the United States had a moral commitment to help the Vietnamese people "because we destroyed their economy and help prostitute their women."

He said just pulling out and forgetting Americans were ever there, is not the humane solution.

Publicize Views

Marasco pleaded with his audience of more than 100 to "stand up and be counted" and make their views — whatever they may be — known to their congressman and the world.

"I have a personal conviction, I am not a member of an organization and my personal appeal to you is to speak out against

"The youngsters have a saying and I think I know what it means, 'Do your own thing.'"

Marasco said he did not think his case was a parallel to the Calley case except that they were both charged with alleged war crimes in Southeast Asia.

Defends GIs

"I personally believe that Calley over-reacted, but what's new," he said. He defended the actions of soldiers in Vietnam combat because of the difficulty of determining who is the enemy.

As in his own case, Marasco said, you never get "instructions written on Department of the Army stationery" to kill people, because the "orders are oblique." What is a soldier supposed to do, Marasco asked, when he is sent with a free-fire zone, which means "that everything that moves in that area is to be killed?"

"We were professionally-trained soldiers — Green Berets. Calley was a green kid," Marasco added.

Marasco, who was given a standing ovation, said in a question-and-answer period that followed there are no "good guys in a war."

After the speech, he signed autographs. To make his point, he signed: "Truth, Robert Marasco."

STATINTL

Ex-Beret Says He Killed Agent on Orders of C.I.A.

By JOHN DARTON

Robert F. Marasco, one of the eight Green Berets who were charged but never tried in the slaying two years ago of a South Vietnamese suspected to have been a double agent, says that he shot and killed the man on "oblique yet very, very clear orders" from the Central Intelligence Agency.

"He was my agent and it was my responsibility to eliminate him with extreme prejudice," Mr. Marasco said in an interview Friday. "Eliminate with extreme prejudice" is the Special Forces' euphemism for a killing.

The "elimination" was approved "up and down our chain of command," the former Army captain added. Although he corroborated details of the slaying, he refused to divulge the names of other persons involved.

Mr. Marasco, now 29 years old and a life insurance salesman in Bloomfield, N.J., said that he was admitting his complicity out of a sense of anger over the conviction of First Lieut. William L. Calley Jr. on charges of premeditated murder in the deaths of 22 civilians at My Lai.

His statements coincide with the publication of a novel called "Court Martial," written jointly by Robin Moore, the author of "The Green Berets," and Henry Rothblatt, the attorney who represented several of the Green Berets arrested in the alleged killing.

The novel is said to be a close rendering of the events that led to the arrest of the Berets, including Col. Robert B. Rheault, then commander of the Army's 3,000 Special Forces personnel in Vietnam. The elite corps, which specializes in counterinsurgency, is still in existence, but is now

deployed elsewhere, according to the Pentagon.

Six of the eight Berets (charges against two were held in abeyance) were to have stood trial on charges of murder and conspiracy in October, 1969. But the Army abruptly dropped the case on Sept. 29, in a decision reviewed by the Nixon Administration, on the ground that it could not enlist the cooperation of the C.I.A., which had refused to provide witnesses.

The Vietnamese agent was Thai Khac Chuyen, whose body was dropped into the South China Sea off Nhatrang, the Special Forces headquarters 180 miles north of Saigon. Despite intensive dredging, it was apparently never recovered.

Mr. Marasco corroborated the following details, all of which have previously been reported in the press with unnamed sources cited.

Mr. Chuyen's role as a double agent was discovered when a raid on a Vietcong camp turned up a photograph of him with a high-ranking North Vietnamese official. He was told he would be sent on an important mission and instead was held in solitary confinement, where he compromised himself through lie detector tests and sodium pentathol (truth serum).

He was first drugged with morphine and then killed by Mr. Marasco in a motorboat with two shots to the head from a .22-caliber pistol equipped with a silencer (which jammed between shots). His body was tossed overboard in a mail sack weighted with chains and tire rims by the three officers in the boat. This was on June 20, 1969.


A cover story was fabricated in which a Japanese-American fitting Mr. Chuyen's description was sent on an air-supported "secret mission" near the Cambodian border.

The question of what to do with Mr. Chuyen led to meetings between Green Beret officers and C.I.A. officials. The C.I.A. in Saigon finally sent a message reading "return agent

to duty" and warning of "flap potential." The message, however, arrived after his death.

Mr. Marasco said Mr. Chuyen was a "principal agent," whose function was to hire, train, pay and coordinate sub-agents on intelligence missions. He refused to give the ultimate aim of the missions and referred the question to a "fact sheet" drawn up by Mr. Moore to publicize his new novel. The "fact sheet" is based on a transcript of the "pre-trial" hearings of the case.

The "fact-sheet" stated that Mr. Chuyen had been involved



The New York Times
Robert F. Marasco

in a secret Special Forces unit known as B-57, whose goal was to pick military targets in Cambodia for a projected incursion by United States and South Vietnamese forces and to train 3,000 Cambodian troops to guard the country from Communism should Prince Norodom Sihanouk be deposed.

In reality, Mr. Marasco stated, Mr. Chuyen was a triple-agent, whose real allegiance was to an organization led by Gen. Duong Van Minh. The success of this group, which was striving for a coalition government, would have led to "Communist control" and "massive extermination," Mr. Marasco asserted.

When the charges against the Berets were dropped, the Secretary of the Army, Stanley R. Resor, said that the C.I.A. was "not directly involved in the alleged incident."

But Mr. Marasco maintains that a vaguely worded execution order was passed on to his

superior officers in Saigon by a "C.I.A. operative whose cover was a lieutenant-colonel, United States Army." He quoted the wording as: "We cannot officially sanction it, but elimination is your best course of action."

"The C.I.A. does not give written orders," Mr. Marasco said. "When someone in the C.I.A. says to you . . . 'your best course of action is elimination' that means 'we approve it.'"

Mr. Marasco claimed there had been "hundreds" — "and I'm being conservative" — of summary executions in South Vietnam. Most, he said, were carried out by the Provincial Reconnaissance Unit, which he described as an assassination squad of Vietnamese natives "trained, financed and equipped by the C. I. A." But others were carried out by American "advisers," he said.

Mr. Marasco resigned from the Army on Oct. 14, 1969, and shortly thereafter was injured in a car collision in New Jersey that kept him on a hospital critical list for 10 days.

Because he is no longer in the Army, he is not subject to court-martial. Previously, he has made guarded statements on the killing, but has never before admitted it. He said he is receiving no money from the novel "Court Martial."

Did he regret his actions? "No," he said. "I felt that it was my duty. Anything I did in military duty in Vietnam was with the biggest patriotic motives. I never wake up in the middle of the night screaming."

STATINTL

2 APR 1971

Former Green Beret Captain Tells of Killing Triple Agent

BLOOMFIELD, N.J. (AP) — Robert F. Marasco, a former captain in the U.S. Special Forces in Vietnam, said last night he shot and killed a South Vietnamese triple agent two years ago — a slaying he and others were accused of but were never brought to trial for.

The execution was carried out at the behest of the Central Intelligence Agency and with the knowledge of "our chain of command," Marasco said.

He said he shot the man twice in the head and, with two other officers, put him into a weighted sack and dumped him from a boat into the South China Sea on June 20, 1969.

Angered by Calley Case


Marasco said he came forward now, at the risk of prosecution for murder, because of his anger over the court-martial of Lt. William L. Calley Jr.

He said he killed the agent because "of orders that were given to me — orders that I felt were legal orders."

Marasco and seven other, including the Green Beret's commander in Vietnam, Col. Robert B. Rheault, were accused by the Army of the slaying. The Army later dropped the charges, saying it did so because it was told the CIA would not permit any of its men to testify at a trial.

Marasco, now 29 and in the insurance business, left the service in October 1969.

While out of reach now of military prosecution, Marasco said, "I'm open to having the charges brought against me



CAPT. ROBERT F. MARASCO

again by civilian authority. That potential was always there. There is no statute of limitation.

"Over the last year and a half I've wanted to release this information."

He got conflicting advice from lawyers, he said, but decided to speak because of "the Calley thing."

"Not Calley himself," said Marasco, "but 'the Calley thing' — all the others who could follow him. This Calley thing should be the last one."

Neither Calley, he said, nor any other soldiers, should be made to stand trial for acts performed under orders and the necessities of duty.

The agent he killed, Thai Khac Chuyen, was discovered to be a double agent when a captured Viet Cong site yielded a photograph of Chuyen with a North Vietnamese general, Marasco said.

Later, it was determined that his true allegiance was to what Marasco identified as "the Third Force," a mostly South Vietnamese organization striving to set up a Communist-desired coalition government in Saigon, he said.

"He was my agent and it was my responsibility to eliminate him with extreme prejudice," which meant to kill Chuyen, Marasco said.

He said the execution order had explicitly come from a CIA

operative who said: "We cannot officially sanction it, but elimination is your best course of action."

Marasco continued: "When someone in the CIA says to you, 'Your best course of action is elimination,' that means, 'we approve it.'"

The former captain said he estimated conservatively that hundreds of summary executions were carried out in South Vietnam, most of them by a Vietnamese assassination squad called the Provincial Reconnaissance Unit that was trained and financed by the CIA.

Marasco said Chuyen was first drugged with morphine and then put aboard a motorboat the night that he shot him twice in the head with a .22-caliber gun equipped with silencer. A mail tire rim was his final shroud and he was pushed over into the sea by Marasco and two other officers, Marasco said.

Executing Chuyen, he said, was a job that had to be done. He said he was extremely resentful that he ever was charged with the slaying.


"Maybe our people have learned this Calley thing should be the last one," he said, "and that's why I'm telling this now."

"My decision was based on my principles, my love for my country, for what it stands for and for what it was built for."

April, 1972

the opium trail

STATINTL



HEROIN
and

IMPERIALISM

This pamphlet was written collectively by a study group supported by the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars. The group included Pat Haseltine, Jerry Meldon, Charles Knight, Mark Selden, Rod Aya, Henry Norr, and Mara. Thanks to all who helped, especially Jim Morrell, Tod McKie, and Jancis Long.

NEW YORK TIMES
12 MAR 1971

C.I.A. ROLES IN LAOS: ADVISING AN ARMY

150 U.S. Agents Help Direct
Secret Guerrilla Forces

By HENRY KAMM

Special to The New York Times

VIENTIANE, Laos, March 11

A month after the enemy attack on the American compound at the northern Laotian military headquarters at Long Tieng, the station chief, case officers and other officials of the American Central Intelligence Agency continue to perform their functions there and at other regional headquarters in Laos.

Though it conducts only ordinary intelligence activities elsewhere, the C.I.A. in Laos takes an active part in managing an army at war. This came about because the 1962 Geneva agreement on the neutrality of Laos barring foreign countries from playing a military role led the United States to turn over its assistance to the agency with the greatest experience in undercover activities.

The army functions separate from the Royal Laotian army, which is equally dependent on American logistic support and is equally financed by the United States, but is commanded by the general staff in Vientiane. The clandestine army is composed largely of mountain tribesmen. Its most active element are of the Meo tribe and its dominant figure is Maj. Gen. Vang Pao, who is also the principal leader of the Meo nation and the commander of the Military Region II of the Royal Laotian army.

Between 150 and 175 C.I.A. agents stationed in Laos are believed to be engaged in helping the guerrilla army. They are augmented by agents who commute from Udorn and other bases in neighboring Thailand.

Their work is coordinated by the station chief. He and his local staff occupy the entire second floor of the two-story United States Embassy. The station chief at Udorn is reported to occupy an important but subordinate command function in C.I.A. operations in Laos that is said to lead to occasional duplication and confusion in the chain of command. For operations involving the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the station chief in Saigon is said to have primary responsibility.

Professionals Preferred

For its work with the Laotian clandestine army, which Americans prefer to call by its official designation—the strategic guerrilla units—the intelligence agency has engaged under two-year renewable contracts a number of former professional soldiers—showing a preference for men of the Special Forces, or Green Berets, and marines—in addition to men whose careers have been with the C.I.A. Their average age is around 30.

Their principal operating bases are Long Tieng, Savannakhet in the center of the southern panhandle and Pakse near the southern tip. Long Tieng is the most active station, because General Vang Pao's guerrilla units, which are the largest, are stationed there, although since the Feb. 14 attack most are spending their nights in Vientiane. Long Tieng has its own station chief. He reports to the Vientiane chief, who figures on the diplomatic list as a special assistant to the ambassador.

The bulk of the agents are case officers, each entrusted with shepherding a combat position or unit of General Vang Pao's troops, whose present strength is estimated at more than 10,000.

Case officers visit "their" units daily, to check on their disposition and their needs. They fly out of Long Tieng in helicopters or STOL—short take-off and landing—planes operated under contract with the intelligence agency by Air America and the Continental Air Services.

They consult with their units officers, ascertain their needs in arms, ammunition, water and food, supplies, tactical air support and helicopter or plane transport for combat operations. They also help with troop morale matters.

Although the agents carry rifles or sidearms and favor camouflage uniforms, their assignment does not include active participation in combat operations.

In the past, there have been frequent violations, but the rarity of casualties indicated that the rule is widely respected.

While counseling Gen. Vang Pao and his officers, the C.I.A. does not command his army at any level, informed sources say. Laotians who know the Meo general well say that his pride and temper rule out anything more than an advisory role in combat operations combined with total dependence on the C.I.A. for transport and pay.

After visiting their units, the case officers return to Long Tieng, where they arrange for the delivery of required supplies, supervising loading of planes or helicopters and submit air support requests to the C.I.A. contractors and the United States Air Force officers also posted at Long Tieng.

Once a week the station chief at Long Tieng submits a report to his superiors in Vientiane and Udorn on the disposition of all troops in the clandestine army.

Case officers also work closely with the Air Force forward air controllers who fly out of Long Tieng and direct fighter-bombers to targets in ground-support missions.

STATINTL

ARMY BLUES

A BUREAUCRACY ADRIIFT

EDWARD F. SHERMAN

Mr. Sherman, assistant professor of law at Indiana University School of Law, has written extensively on military justice. He had been an Army officer, and has served as counsel in a number of free-speech cases involving the military.

The American military is today an institution in crisis, beset by critics on the outside and by dissension and scandal within. Rocked by adverse publicity about internal graft, breakdown of morale among the troops, and war atrocities, it has countered with a public relations campaign designed to project a new image. But behind the sparkle of press releases is the reality that the limited changes made thus far, although worth while, are unlikely to cure the malaise.

The truth is that the armed forces comprise a bureaucracy adrift from its traditional moorings, unsure of its present role, apprehensive as to its future, and defensive about its recent past. We seem to be witnessing one of those infrequent occasions when a powerful institution finds itself unable to cope with the times; the situation resembles that of American capitalism after the 1929 crash or the Catholic Church before the papacy of John XXIII. When an institution reaches that point it must either resign itself to continued crisis or undertake fundamental change.

Vietnam, of course, has had much to do with the military's current problems, but they cannot be explained simply by the fact that, as some claim, the military has been made the scapegoat for the war. The trouble goes much deeper, and, though it may have arisen during the war in Vietnam, it is not likely to disappear with the de-escalation or termination of that conflict.

First, the military is experiencing an inability to recruit, train and utilize its men so serious as to threaten its very survival. The tensions and animosities raised by the administration of the draft laws during an unpopular war that does not require the services of all the country's young men have inevitably had their effect. Second, a breakdown has occurred in the dedication, efficiency and moral fiber of some career personnel, and that is always an omen of bureaucratic decay. And finally, the military's record during the years of Vietnam, in everything from the treatment of its own people to the conduct of battle-field operations, has raised doubt as to the compatibility of a number of its practices with contemporary democratic social values. The way in which these problems are resolved will have a profound effect upon the structure of the military, and indeed, of our democratic state.

Difficulty with its personnel is today the military's most serious problem. AWOL and desertion rates have tripled in the period of Vietnam; they are down slightly since the beginning of troop withdrawals, but are still far above prewar levels. A serviceman now goes AWOL every three minutes, the annual total being 250,000 AWOLs and desertions, on average. Established groups in both Europe and the Far East assist GIs desiring to desert, and the command in Vietnam is

increasingly disturbed by the desertions of men on leave in Hong Kong and other Asian cities. But far more significant than overseas desertions is the rise of AWOLs from American bases, a practice so prevalent that many units are chronically under strength.

Courts-martial have risen dramatically during the war, both for military offenses (such as AWOL and disobedience) and for civilian crimes (such as homicide, larceny and drug offenses). Charges related to anti-war dissent have also boosted the court-martial statistics. As a result, some 20,000 servicemen are now incarcerated in military briggs, stockades and prisons. Military confinement facilities are frequently substandard and sometimes close to scandalous. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that the average age of the prisoners is 19 and that only 5 per cent of them have committed acts which would be crimes under civilian law.

Racial tension and turmoil continue. Blacks complain bitterly of discrimination in assignments, promotions and military justice, and their dissatisfaction has not been appreciably lessened by 1969 Pentagon directives aimed at curbing such inequities and permitting blacks some cultural identity. Although about 13 per cent of enlisted men are black, Negroes constitute only 3.2 per cent of commissioned officers in the Army, 1.7 per cent in the Air Force, 1.2 per cent in the Marine Corps, and less than 1 per cent in the Navy. The services are entirely integrated, but racial traditions persist: most of the stewards and other Navy personnel who serve the officers on board ship are blacks or Orientals and, even at West Point, the dining hall "mess boys" are blacks and Latins.

A disproportionate number of career officers and non-commissioned officers are white Southerners, and blacks claim that they ignore Pentagon directives about race. Also, a great many military installations are in the South, and blacks do not enjoy serving at posts surrounded by communities that continue to discriminate in housing and other accommodations. The Department of Defense has not used its power to force integration in most Southern states by placing Jim Crow facilities "off-limits" (by contrast, when 440 black GIs held a "Call for Justice" meeting at the University of Heidelberg on July 4, 1970, the commanding general finally took "off-limits" action against some German landlords who practiced discrimination).

Racial riots and violence, often resulting in injuries and sometimes in death, are common on military installations. Posts in Germany have been literally torn apart by clashes between black and white American soldiers. "Fragging" (tossing a hand grenade into a vehicle or room) has occurred so often in Vietnam—frequently against soldiers or officers of the other race—that it is now referred to as a separate type of crime. Although black and white servicemen work side by side, the races mix less and less at other times, and racial symbols—from "KKK" scrawled on NCO club walls to the elaborate and time-consuming "liberation handshake" used by most black servicemen—indicate a high degree of racial separatism.

JUL 25 1971

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MISSION OVER

Green Berets— Saying Goodby to Themselves

BY GEORGE McARTHUR
Times Staff Writer

NHA TRANG, South Vietnam—The faded Green Berets, possibly the only American soldiers who liked this war, made their formal farewells Wednesday. There were a few half-hidden tears as the band played but no regrets.

Col. Michael Healy, a rumples, deep-throated soldier, stood beneath a drizzling rain and said the final words:

"Our job is done. We can withdraw from the battlefield with our heads high and pride in the gallant officers and men of the 5th Special Forces Group."

It was a brief moment in history, a footnote perhaps, and the words were appropriate. The rhetoric would have sounded false in other units which have long since lost most of their identity in Vietnam. But the Green Berets, battered thought they were, played their own game to the end.

Dignitaries Absent

Though U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and military commander Gen. Creighton W. Abrams were invited to the final parade at Green Beret headquarters, neither attended. It didn't matter to the close-knit band of sturdy men talking about such places as Loe Ninh, Bu Dop or Lang Vei. It was as if the Green Berets were saying goodby to themselves.

They were on their good behavior, though some admitted hangovers from a private party Tuesday. The small, white-painted compound, the neatest military camp in South Vietnam, was spotless. A camouflage cargo parachute was spread over a bit of grass where drinks were served. There was pink champagne and succulent lobster lifted Wednesday morning.

Sea by Nha Trang fishermen. There were even big dolphins carved in ice by a Green Beret rifleman.

It was a far cry from the John Wayne days when small teams of Special Forces troops recruited motley bands of Montagnards to defend remote camps along the borders.

Hazardous Duty

Through those lean years every Green Beret in almost 100 such camps knew he probably could be overrun—if the enemy wanted to pay the price. At places like Bu Prang, shelled and besieged for 45 days, life literally depended on the flick of an eyelash. The Green Berets, who seldom numbered more than about 1,500 men in Vietnam, left 700 dead, mostly in camps like that.

Unlike most Army units, the Green Berets remember such things as vivid, only-yesterday experiences. Their memory is active since nobody much pays any attention to a Special Forces type on his first tour. They keep coming back and a few have served eight and even nine years in Vietnam.

Sgt. 1 C. Antonio J. Coelho, a 44-year-old who has been a Green Beret since their earliest days, is more or less typical. He resigned from the Army a few years ago but came back "because I missed these so-and-soes."

A stocky short-spoken man, Coelho stood at attention with the staff Wednesday to get the last medal which will be presented at a Special Forces formation in Vietnam. It was the Distinguished Service Cross, the nation's second highest combat medal, given Coelho for two rescue missions only last August. Twice he led helicopter teams through hails of fire to save both American and Vietnamese soldiers.

The Vietnamese were members of the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups which are the pride of the Green Berets. Though they are frequently called mercenaries, the CIDGs are mainly Montagnard or ethnic Cambodian peoples who choose the Special Forces rather than face the South Vietnamese draft.

The Green Berets formed fierce attachments to the CIDGs, mainly to the simple, sturdy tribesman of the highlands. Almost every Green Beret sports one or more of the

and bronze bracelets the Montagnards give away as tokens of esteem (along

with lots of rice wine which they also ladle out liberally at ceremonial events).

Saigon Conflict

"We took them out of leincloths and put them into uniforms and now they are elite forces," Col. Healy says. "It does something to you to remember the old days and then see some of them now wearing officers' shoulder boards. They are no longer social outcasts, they are part of the country."

In those early days Healy referred to, the Green Berets got into trouble siding with the Montagnards in their fights with the Saigon government. The conflict sometimes had humorous aspects.

In those mixed up days the Central Intelligence Agency was actually paying the salaries of the CIDG troops and the money came down through the Green Berets to be distributed by the South Vietnamese officers who were nominally in command. The South Vietnamese would frequently pocket much of the money. One Special Forces captain, who was unable to get his counterpart to cooperate in properly paying the troops, used a blunt solution.

One month on payday he called the camp together and explained what had been happening. Then he put the money—about \$5,000 worth of Vietnamese piasters—in a gasoline soaked pit and burned it all. Next month, with the camp near mutiny, the South Vietnamese captain agreed to set up a reasonable accounting system.

The loyalty of the Green Berets for the CIDGs, whom they affectionately call "Yards," a shortening of the French pronunciation for Montagnards, is evident in other ways. Of the nine Medals of Honor won by Green Berets in Vietnam (four posthumously), four were won by men risking their lives to save their CIDG comrades.

At the peak of Special Forces strength in South Vietnam, the CIDG forces

STATINTL

Continued

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Large Command

At the peak of Special Forces strength in South Vietnam, the CIDG forces numbered about 100,000. Technically South Vietnamese were in command of

these and the Green Berets were advisers, but in practice the bird colonels who commanded the Green Berets from Nha Trang controlled more troops than any American divisional general in the country.

This gave the Green Berets much of their character. They wore bronze bracelets, ate Vietnamese and Montagnard food and bragged about their capacity for rice wine. (They also usually had the best food in the country in their own messes. It was poor Special Forces camp that hadn't scrounged ice boxes, stoves and whatnot. One camp in the delta spirited a Chinese cook from Saigon and kept him as a well-paid but restive prisoner for months. A guard was sent with him on the infrequent times he was given leave.)

The funding of the CIDG by the CIA was an early example of the embarrassing marriage of convenience between the Green Berets and "the spooks."

In the delta region where the CIDG troopers were ethnic Cambodians, they were also mostly at least nominal members of the "Khmer Serei," a free Cambodia movement headed by Son Ngoc Thanh. In effect, while denying all such charges, the CIA and the Green Berets created almost a private army of Cambodians, to the natural chagrin of then ruling Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

When Sihanouk was ousted last March, Thanh soon surfaced as an "adviser" to the new regime and five battalions of CIDG troopers, now called Khmer Krom, quickly went to serve the new Cambodian government. They were, in fact, considered the only dependable troops the Phnom Penh regime then had.

The liaison with the CIA flared into a major embarrassment almost two years ago when eight Green Berets, including their respected and rising commander, Col. Robert B. Knauft, were accused of murdering a suspected

STATINTL

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Escalation of Viet War Is Unlikely

By Jack Anderson

Down through the Vietnam War years, the raw facts about the fighting have gone through such a filtering and flavoring process that the public no longer trusts the official statements.

This is reflected in the large number of inquiries we receive, asking what is really happening on the battlefield. We have sought the answers from our own competent and confidential sources. Here are the most newsworthy replies:

What is the real purpose of the drive into Laos?

The aim is to cut the North Vietnamese supply line. But unfortunately, most of the supplies for the present dry season had already moved down the Ho Chi Minh trail network before the South Vietnamese struck. Intelligence reports show a heavy flow of war goods down the infiltration routes during the dry months of September, October and November. But the flow had already dwindled to a trickle before the South Vietnamese could cut it off.

What is the risk that the Laos invasion will escalate the war?

Hanoi isn't expected to mass a large force in Laos to resist the South Vietnamese operation. Allied forces, complete with waiting planes and massed artillery, are prepared to devastate any North Vietnamese force that might come

into the open. The Communist strategy has always been to avoid battles they might lose and wait for a chance to attack a vulnerable spot. Hanoi is more likely, therefore, to strike back elsewhere at a weak point. The best clue: Communist forces already have increased the military pressure on the Royal Lao government in northern Laos.

Chinese in Laos

Is Red China likely to intervene in Laos?

The Red Chinese have warned that they won't remain indifferent to the South Vietnamese drive into Laos but would take "all effective measures" to aid the Communist forces. In recent months, the Chinese have stepped up construction of a road that cuts across Laos almost to the Thai border. The construction crew and guard force, which formerly had numbered no more than 3,000, has now been increased to more than 15,000. The best estimate is that the road is intended as a supply line for Communist guerrillas, not an invasion route for Chinese troops.

Is the White House telling the truth about the absence of U.S. combat troops in Laos?

American ground troops stopped at the Laotian border, although they are ready for action in Laos if they should be needed to help repel a North Vietnamese counterattack. CIA-led guerrilla bands

of mountain tribesmen also operating in southern Laos, assisting the South Vietnamese invaders. Technically, the American advisers aren't military men but civilians on the CIA payroll. The Army's special forces, however, have sent observation teams across the border.

Is President Nixon trying to win or to wind down the Vietnam War?

The President is seeking to turn the war over to the South Vietnamese but to leave them strong enough to defend themselves. He also wants to protect the withdrawing American troops from a possible Asian Dunkirk. He views the drive into Ho Chi Minh trail complex and the bombing attacks upon North Vietnam as rear-guard action to reduce Hanoi's ability to mount an offensive. Meanwhile, the President has withdrawn almost all draftees from combat operations. Before the end of the year, he hopes to keep all Americans out of combat except for air and artillery support for the South Vietnamese.

Mafia Expose

Some of the nation's most notorious racketeers, identified in federal files as Mafia bigwigs, has been living quietly in New York's fashionable Westchester County until a gravel-voiced newspaper editor straight out of "Front

Page," decided to fight them his own way.

Barney Waters, editor of the Herald Statesman, knew that Cosa Nostra chieftans had settled in the Yonkers area.

Waters ordered his reporters to dig into the criminal backgrounds of the hoodlums who were living in fashionable respectability in the community. Then he sent his photographers around to take pictures of their villa-style suburban homes.

For two years he battled the mobsters, winding up with a dramatic, two-week series. Even before the series began, the hoods learned of it and threatened Waters' life. The Herald Statesman's general manager, Jack Sheils, received a gruff telephone threat against the newspaper plant. Two .38 pistol shots blasted the newspaper's windows one night shattering glass in the advertising department.

During the two years, Waters got hundreds of threatening calls, four broken windshields and six different tires slashed. But through it all, the vinegary editor refused even to remove his name from the telephone directory.

Footnote: Our own Mafia sources said publicity "spooks" the big boys worse than a prosecution. Meanwhile, the Mafia is spreading into other suburban communities.

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America's Air Guerrillas-

Will They Stop Future Vietnams?

What is the full story behind the man being congratulated by President Richard Nixon in the picture above?

The man is U.S. Air Force Brig. Gen. Leroy J. Manor. His name appeared in headlines as the commander of the recent daring attempt to rescue American prisoners of war in North Vietnam. As people around the world know, the mission flew about 100 U. S. commandos in a gallant but futile effort to free POW's at the Sontay camp 23 miles from Hanoi.

Few people know, however, that this brand of daredevil military action is the rule, not the exception, for General Manor and the hush-hush outfit of air commandos he commands, the Special Operations Force (SOF).

"If we can get into it early enough, we can probably keep any insurgency situation from expanding into another Vietnam-sized war," says General Manor, whose SOF has been active in 28 countries, such as Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Peru, Guatemala, Spain and North Korea.

Secretly established by President John F. Kennedy in April, 1961, the SOF has introduced a new dimension to guerrilla warfare. The hard-trained air commandos use a diversity of aircraft and a fantastic assortment of deadly weapons to harass the enemy.

SOF goes into a friendly country with approval of the State Department, often in collaboration with the CIA or Green Berets.

Top secret missions

Here are several missions, some of them untold, which SOF has carried out:

VIETNAM—The air commandos tasted battle in the spring of 1962 when President Kennedy covertly sent them to the aid of the beleaguered South Vietnamese. Wearing civilian clothes and flying planes with the markings of the South Vietnamese Air Force, the commandos attacked Vietcong concentrations in the jungles. **Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001100100004-1**

by Donald Robinson
SOF staff officers say without hesitation, "We should have gone into South Vietnam back in 1956 when the insurgency was beginning. Then we could easily have smashed it."

THAILAND — Here it's been different. When Hanoi-paid terrorists began infiltrating northeast Thailand in 1964, the Pentagon secretly dispatched a team of 32 air commandos, which has since grown into an entire wing, numbering many hundreds. They have kept the guerrillas on the run ever since, spilling out flares that turn jungle nights into day, then bombing and strafing the area. They've raced Thai troops from hot spot to hot spot near the Laotian border and given them fire support. They've destroyed guerrilla supply caches and cut escape routes.

They've given guerrillas a dose of their own medicine by forming six-man tracking teams who move as stealthily as American Indians. They can trail a guerrilla band through the jungle for weeks on end, even eavesdrop on their campfire conversations, and at the right moment call in an SOF plane for a surprise attack.

NORTH KOREA — The air commandos have undertaken some astonishing clandestine missions in North Korea. Details on the North Korean actions are top secret, but an SOF officer who served in the South during the mid-1960's remembers drawing up plans for commando missions into the North which would knock out some of the enemy's ability to infiltrate into the South.

TIBET — The United States trained a force of Tibetan peasants to counter the threat of Chinese aggression in the late 1950's, when the SOF was merely an unnamed collection of Air Force units working with the CIA.

Col. Fletcher Prouty, a now retired Air Force officer who helped organize the SOF in 1961, tells the story:

"We knew the Chinese were eventually going to come into Tibet, so we started recruiting a resistance force from among the natives. Up to 42,000

Tibetans were put under arms.

"We flew groups of tribesmen from Tibet to Saipan and from there to the Rocky Mountains in Colorado, where the atmosphere is similar to the Himalayas, for combat training. In six weeks they were back in Tibet, and a fairly good ground force was built up. But then Gary Powers' U-2 was shot down in 1960, and President Eisenhower cut off all such missions."

SAUDI ARABIA—In 1963, a routine SOF training mission uncovered an Egypt-sponsored plan for revolution in Saudi Arabia. An SOF officer was flying with a Saudi Arabian Air Force pilot in an American plane over the desert, teaching him counter-guerrilla tactics, when he spotted some strange-looking bundles on the sands below. They landed and found 130 Egyptian parachutes with Czech rifles and ammunition. Cairo was trying to start an uprising against the pro-Western King Faisal, but the Egyptian pilots had missed the drop zone.

A squadron of USAF fighter-bombers soon arrived along Saudi Arabia's borders for a show of strength and President Nasser lost taste for the uprising.

LATIN AMERICA—SOF training of Latin American air forces has been extensive.

An SOF team trained and advised the Bolivian Air Force units that helped to track down the Castroite guerrilla chief Che Guevara.

I watched an SOF team instructing the Guatemalan Air Force in helicopter tactics. The Guatemalans had been employing small helicopters that couldn't fly above 10,500 feet. Any time the Guatemalan airmen pursued guerrillas into the towering mountains, the Communists climbed beyond reach and shot down at the "choppers" with impunity.

The SOF got them three big Bell helicopters from the U.S. that could soar higher than any mountain in Guatemala. Guatemalan pilots were taught how to maneuver the new "choppers" in the violent winds, how to land troops un-
attack enemy strongpoints.

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Last U.S. Green Beret Camps Turned Over to S. Vietnamese

SAIGON, Jan. 4 (AP)—The saga of the Green Berets in Vietnam came to an end today with the transfer of the last two Special Forces camps to the South Vietnamese.

The move reflected the Vietnamization of the war and the downgrading of the Green Berets, currently out of favor with U.S. Army regulars though their exploits won them fame in song and story, and even a movie.

At their peak, the Green Berets operated 80 camps in Vietnam, mostly near the borders of Laos and Cambodia.

At the camps, small teams of Green Berets recruited and commanded civilian irregular mercenaries, largely mountain tribesmen called Montagnards.

The camps had been operated by the U.S. Special Forces since 1964, although some Green Berets were sent to Vietnam as early as 1961 on temporary assignments. Sources said Green Berets would continue to lead clandestine operations in Laos. Informants said the Green Beret unit is likely to return to Ft. Bragg, N.C.

The last camp transfers were carried out as the U.S. Command announced further cuts in American troop strength and amid unofficial predictions that the American withdrawal from Vietnam would be speeded.

The U.S. Command announced a drop in troop strength of 2,100 men, lowering the total of American servicemen in Vietnam as of Dec. 31 to 335,800.

The figure was the lowest in four years and 8,200 below the 344,000 men President Nixon had set as the goal for the end of last year.

On the battlefields no major action was reported, but U.S. B-52 bombers attacked North Vietnamese positions in South Vietnam for the first time in a month.

In Vientiane today, informed sources said a secret military operation in northern Laos has failed to destroy North Vietnamese supplies pouring into the Plain of Jars.

But the informants said the operation has succeeded partially in taking pressure off the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's Long Cheng nerve center southwest of the plain.

Laotian military spokesmen have refused to disclose details of the month-long operation centered on Ban Ban, east of the Plain of Jars, and newsmen are forbidden to travel to the area.